Interpreting the Constitution from Inside the
Jury Box: Affecting Interstate Commerce
as an Element of the Crime by Smith, Richard W.
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 55 | Issue 2 Article 8
Spring 3-1-1998
Interpreting the Constitution from Inside the Jury
Box: Affecting Interstate Commerce as an Element
of the Crime
Richard W. Smith
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure
Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard W. Smith, Interpreting the Constitution from Inside the Jury Box: Affecting Interstate Commerce
as an Element of the Crime, 55 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 615 (1998),
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol55/iss2/8
Interpreting the Constitution from Inside the
Jury Box: Affecting Interstate Commerce
as an Element of the Crime
Richard W. Smith*
Lord Coke is quoted as saying that reason is the life of the law. Charles
Dickens, in Oliver Twist, had one of his characters say that the law is an
ass. It may be that there are those in this day and time who would think it
absurd for an appellate court to hold a trial court in error for failing to
charge the jury that it might find a defendant not guilty of an offense which
he did not deny having committed. Yet such is the law and reason is the
life of the law.'
L Introduction
On October 29, 1993, Charles Parker, Jr. entered a Payless Shoe Store in
Fort Worth, Texas.2 Curiously, Parker did not browse through the racks of
discounted shoes; he had something else on his mind The store's cash
register contained $136 - money that Parker found and stuffed into his
pocket.4 Over the following two weeks, Parker helped himself to cash in five
other store robberies and, including the Payless heist, stole a total of $459.'
* The author would like to thank Michael Sackey, Professors LauraFitzgerald and Scott
Sundby, and Alison Smith, all of whom contributed mightily to this Note.
1. United States v. Skinner, 437 F.2d 164, 166 (5th Cir. 1971).
2. See United States v. Parker, 104 F.3d 72, 73 & n.1 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (DeMoss, J.,
dissenting) (listing October 29, 1993 as day that Parker made Payless Shoe Store his first rob-
bery victim in string of six), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1720 (1997).
3. See id. (DeMoss, J., dissenting) (noting that Parker robbed Payless Shoe Store).
4. See id. at 73 n. 1 (DeMoss, J., dissenting) (noting that Parker stole $136 from Payless
Shoe Store).
5. See id. at73 & n.1 (DeMoss, J., dissenting) (listing six business establishments that
Parker robbed, including dollar amount stolen, name of store clerk, and date). The date, loca-
tion, and cash taken in each robbery are as follows: Oct. 29,1993, Payless Shoe Store, $136.00;
Nov. 4, 1993, Chevron Station, $27.00; Nov. 5, 1993, Chief Auto Parts Store, $40.00; Nov. 5,
1993, Fina Station, $50.00; Nov. 6, 1993, Diamond Shamrock Service Station, $97.00; Nov.
11, 1993, Edwards Drug Store, $109.00. Id. at 73 n. 1 (DeMoss, J., dissenting). The total sum
that Parker stole amounted to $459.00. See id. (DeMoss, J., dissenting) (providing individual
amounts).
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Parker's six thefts were less than legendary; they were garden variety
robberies that occur each day in every city.6 Unlike other petty criminals,
however, Parker was not prosecuted for robbery under state law.7 Instead, on
January 11, 1994,8 a grand jury summoned the resources and power of the
federal government and indicted Parker on six counts of violating a federal
statute - the Hobbs Act.9
At Parker's two-day trial, federal Judge John McBryde instructed thejury
that the Hobbs Act"0 is a federal criminal statute consisting of two elements:
(1) the commission of a typical robbery or extortion and (2) a resulting effect
6. Id. at 73 n.1 (DeMoss, J., dissenting) (describing Parker's robberies as routine).
Judge DeMoss expressed frustration that the federal prosecutor charged Parker in federal court
with such routine crimes. See id (DeMoss, J., dissenting) (calling robberies "typical"). Judge
DeMoss stated, "The robberies involved inthis case weretypical garden variety robberies which
occur routinely in cities, towns, and villages across this land and are customarily dealt with by
the local police departments and the state's prosecutorial offices." Id. (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
7. See id. (DeMoss, J., dissenting) (noting that state and local authorities generally
handle similar petty crimes).
8. Supplemental Brief of Appellant on Rehearing En Banc at 1, United States v. Parker,
104 F.3d 72 (5th Cir. 1997) (No. 94-10557).
9. Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994). The grand jury also indicted Parker on two
counts of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence in connection with two of the
six robberies. United States v. Parker, 73 F.3d 48, 50 (5th Cir. 1996), reinstated in part en
banc, 104 F.3d 72 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1720 (1997). Parker's father testified at
trial that he had found a toy pistol in his son's trousers after his son's arrest. Id. at 53-54.
Parker's attorney presented the "toy gun theory" in his opening argument and claimed that the
lone eyewitness to one of the robberies would testify that the weapon Parker used "could have
been a toy gun." Id. Parker's attorney forgot to ask the witness whether the apparent weapon
could have been a toy. Id. Realizing his omission after he closed his case in chief, Parker's
attorney moved to reopen his case in chief so that he could recall the witness. Id at 53. The
trial judge denied the motion. Id. On appeal, the appellate court determined that the trial court
was in error for not having reopened the case so that Parker's attorney could ask the critical
question. Id. at 54. The appellate court reversed the two firearm convictions and remanded the
case to the trial court. Id. at 54 n.3.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1951. The Hobbs Act states in relevant part:
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion...
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
(b) As used in this section -
(3) The term "commerce" means commerce within the District ofColumbia,
or any Territory or Possession of the United States; all commerce between any
point in a State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and any
point outside thereof; all commerce between points within the same State
through any place outside such State; and all other commerce over which the
United States has jurisdiction.
Id.; see also infra note 45 (providing full text of Hobbs Act).
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on interstate commerce." The Government proved the first necessary element
to the jury's satisfaction, but its theory of the second element was more
attenuated: Parker's targeted stores routinely deposited their proceeds in
Texas banks each week; those banks in turn wired the stores' deposits to
accounts with banks located in other states.' 2 By stealing money from Fort
Worth stores, the Government argued, Parker prevented the stores from
transferring funds to banks outside of Texas; thus, the insignificant robberies
"affected interstate commerce."13 The jury returned a guilty verdict for five
counts of federal Hobbs Act violations, and Parker received a sentence of 430
months - almost 36 years in federal prison - for stealing $459.14
Parker appealed his conviction." He claimed that the United States
Constitution's Fifth and Sixth Amendments establish that the criminal jury
alone may determine whether a defendant is ultimately guilty of a crime.'
6
Parker argued that Judge McBryde had impermissibly removed the Hobbs
Act's interstate commerce element from the jury by instructing that the jury
11. See Supplemental Brief for the United States on Rehearing En Banc at 3, Parker (No.
94-10557) (discussing court's instructions). The court actually instructed the jury that there
were three elements, but the first two- "that the defendant obtained or took property of another
or in the presence of another" and "that the defendant took that property against the person's
will, by means of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear"- collapse into the single robbery
element See id. (providing text of instructions).
12. See Parker, 104 F.3d at 73-74 (DeMoss, J., dissenting) (providing jury instructions
that allowed guilty verdict only if Government proved businesses deposited their proceeds with
Texas bank that routinely transferred funds for deposit in bank in another state). The jury
returned a guilty verdict Id. at 72.
13. See id (DeMoss, J., dissenting) (providing thatjury must find Parker guilty if Govem-
ment proved businesses deposited their proceeds with Texas bank that routinely transferred
funds for deposit in bank in another state).
14. Id at 73 & n.2 (DeMoss, J., dissenting) (indicating that jury found Parker guilty on
all counts and judge sentenced Parker to serve 430 months). Parker's sentence was not solely
for the Hobbs Act violations. See id (DeMoss, J., dissenting). The trialjudge sentenced Parker
to serve 130 months - more than 10 years - for his Hobbs Act violations and 300 months -
exactly 25 years - for use of a firearm during the robberies. Id. (DeMoss, J., dissenting). The
appellate court reversed the firearm convictions and remanded them for retrial. See supra note
9 (detailing appeal and procedural posture of firearm-related convictions).
15. See Parker, 104 F.3d at 72-73 (discussing appeal).
16. See id. at74 (DeMoss, J., dissenting) (providing Parker's argument). Parker's written
objections read as follows:
The finding by the court that certain facts establish the interstate commerce
nexus deprives the defendant of due process, and the right to trial byjury. Counsel
recognizes Fifth Circuit law allows this procedure under the theory the interstate
commerce element is jurisdictional. However, counsel believes current Fifth
Circuit law to be in conflict with the logic of Supreme Court precedent
Id. (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
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was merely to decide whether the robbed stores routinely made deposits that
were wired to banks in other states.17 Thejudge summarily instructed the jury
that those facts, if true, would prove the effect on interstate commerce neces-
sary for a Hobbs Act conviction. 8
A Fifth Circuit panel, citing the recent Supreme Court opinion in United
States v. Gaudin,9 agreed with Parker that the instructions were improper.2"
Although the instructions correctly asked the jury to determine factual ques-
tions concerning the interstate bank transfers, the judge erroneously required
the jury automatically to find an effect on interstate commerce once those
factual allegations were deemed true.2 Sitting en banc, however, the Fifth
17. See id. at 73-74 (DeMoss, J., dissenting). The court instructed the jury on the inter-
state commerce element as follows:
It does not matter whether the defendant knew that his conduct would interfere
with interstate commerce. Interstate commerce means commerce or travel between
one state, territory, or possession of the United States and another state, territory,
or possession of the United States, including the District of Columbia. Commerce
includes travel, trade, transportation, and communication.
If you believe beyond a reasonable doubt the government's evidence regarding
the handling of cash proceeds from the Payless Shoe Store referred to in Count I
of the indictment, that is, that monies obtained from the operations of such store
were routinely wired or electronically transferred from the State of Texas for
deposit in a bank in another state, then you are instructed that the interstate com-
merce element, which I have just referred to as the third element of the offense
charged by Count 1 of the indictment, has been satisfied.
Supplemental Brief for the United States on Rehearing En Banc at 3-4, United States v. Parker,
104 F.3d 72 (5th Cir. 1997) (No. 94-10557); see Parker, 104 F.3d at 73-74 (DeMoss, J., dis-
senting) (analyzing second portion of instruction).
18. See Parker, 104 F.3d at 73-74 (DeMoss, J., dissenting) (providing instruction). The
judge found that the facts, if true, were sufficient to show that the defendant affected interstate
commerce: "If you believe beyond a reasonable doubt the government's evidence... then you
are instructed that the interstate commerce element.., has been satisfied." Id. (DeMoss, J.,
dissenting). The jury merely found that the facts were true. See id. (DeMoss, J., dissenting)
(analyzing instructions). No application of fact to law was required. See id. (DeMoss, J.,
dissenting) (same).
19. 515 U.S. 506 (1995); see also infra notes 223-43 and accompanying text (discussing
Gaudin).
20. See United States v. Parker, 73 F.3d 48, 50-53 (5th Cir. 1996) (discussing appeal),
vacated in part en banc, 104 F.3d 72 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1720 (1997). The panel
opinion recognized the "syllogistic neatness" ofthe Supreme Court's opinion in Gaudin, decided
after Parker's trial: "[E]very element of an offense charged must be proven to the satisfaction
of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt; 'materiality' is an element of the offense charged under
§ 1001; therefore, thejury, not the Court, must decide the issue ofmateriality." Id. at52 (quoting
UnitedStatesv. Gaudin, 515U.S. 506, 524(1995)(Rehnquist, C.J.,concurring)). Thepanelopin-
iontooktheGaudinsyllogismoutofthe§ 1001 contextandapplied ittotheHobbsAct'sinterstate
commerce element. Id.; see infra notes 223 -42 and accompanying text (discussing Gaudin).
21. See Parker, 73 F.3d at 52 (applying Gaudin syllogism).
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Circuit reversed and announced without explanation that thejury instructions
were not erroneous.22 Thus, Parker's conviction stands on a jury instruction
that denied the jury the power to decide whether his robberies did indeed
"affect interstate commerce" so as to justify his Hobbs Act conviction.'
Parker's story is not unique. Congress increasingly includes in federal
criminal statutes the element that Parker's judge removed from the jury's
control - the defendant's effect on interstate commerce; 24 moreover, these
federal criminal statutes are proliferating.' As the number of statutes grows
and jury instructions on the interstate commerce elements of those crimes
continue to remove elements from the jury, courts will undermine the right to
jury trial more frequently.
26
Parker's story does not raise concerns about only the Constitution's Fifth
and Sixth Amendment protections; it also presents an issue about Congress's
power to enact federal crimes.27 As a matter of constitutional law, to make
simple robbery a federal crime, Congress had to include the affecting inter-
22. See Parker, 104 F.3d at 73 (finding "no Gaudin-type error"). The en banc court did
not specifically address Parker's claim that the instruction permitted the jury to find only the
penultimate facts, not the ultimate fact of an effect on interstate commerce. See id. at 73-74
(DeMoss, J., dissenting) (providing jury instructions and interpretation thereof). The relevant
portion of the en banc decision consists of one sentence: "Having reviewed the record and the
briefs and arguments of the parties, we have determined that the trial court committed no
Gaudin-type error." Id. at 73. The en banc majority's unsatisfying opinion provided no other
reasoning. See id. at 75 (DeMoss, J., dissenting). There were two dissents. See id. at 72.
Judge DeMoss's dissent explicitly highlighted the majority's lack of reasoning and future
guidance. See id. at 75 (DeMoss, J., dissenting) (expressing view that en banc majority "ducked
its obligation to give guidance to judges and practitioners as to developing legal issues").
DeMoss voiced his concern that the majority delivered its one-sentence opinion "without so
much as one citation to any case or any elaborations of what reasoning they used to arrive at this
conclusion." Id (DeMoss, J., dissenting). DeMoss further suggested:
A determination that "the trial court committed no Gaudin-type error," which is the
heart of the majority's opinion, gives no indication to the Bench and bar of this
Circuit (i) as to what "a Gaudin-type error" is nor (ii) how elements of a crime
which involve mixed questions of fact and law should be submitted after the
Supreme Court's decision in Gaudin.
Id. (DeMoss, J., dissenting). The second dissent was as hollow as the majority opinion.
Compare id (DeMoss, J., dissenting) with id. at 72 (following similar reasoning). Further
adding to the confusion, all three original panelists joined the majority en banc, and the author
of the panel opinion also authored the en banc opinion. Compare id. at 72 with Parker, 73 F.3d
at 50, vacated in part en bane, 104 F.3d 72 (listing same judges).
23. See infra Part V (analyzing Parker decision).
24. See infra Part IILC (discussing incentive for jurisdictional element).
25. See infra Part III.A (discussing federalization of crime).
26. See infra notes 89-168 and accompanying text (discussing effect of federalization of
crime and jury instructions that remove element from jury).
27. See infra Part III.B (discussing constitutional constraints on Congress's power).
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state commerce element in its definition of the crime.2" Indeed, without proof
that Parker's $459 robbery spree affected interstate commerce, Congress
would be without jurisdiction to impose any federal sanctions on him for that
conduct.29 The limitation on Congress's power thus presents another compel-
ling constitutional reason to ensure that judges properly make and administer
interstate commerce jury instructions in federal prosecutions."
This Note suggests that jury instructions on the "affecting interstate
commerce" element of federal crimes often violate defendants' rights to jury
trials by effectively removing that jurisdictional element from the jury, thus
permitting judges to usurp the jury's constitutional role.3 ' The Note explores
this premise by analyzing the Hobbs Act,32 a federal criminal statute that
28. See infra Part III.C (discussing jurisdictional element).
29. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560-62 (1995); see also infra Part III.B
(discussing constitutional constraints).
30. See United States v. Spriggs, 102 F.3d 1245,1260 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (offering require-
ment that defendant affected interstate commerce as example of"jurisdictional element"), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 97 (1997). Elements arefacts thatthe prosecution mustprove in orderto sustain
a conviction. See Commonwealth v. Burke, 457 N.E.2d 622, 624 (Mass. 1983) (analyzing
prosecutor's burden). Jurisdictional elements differfrom substantive elements because Congress
includes the former in criminal statutes to ensure that, in every prosecuted case, application ofthe
statute to the defendant's activity falls within thejurisdiction of Congress under the Constitution.
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (describingjurisdictional elementas one thatensures on case-by-case
basis that defendant's activity fallswithinpowerofCongress to censurehis conduct). Substantive
elements are the elements that define the scope ofthe prohibited criminal activity. See infra notes
48-56 and accompanying text (discussing Hobbs Act's substantive elements). Jurisdictional
elements define the circumstances under which activity satisfying the substantive elements is
deemed illegal under the statute in question. See infra notes 65-88 and accompanying text
(discussing Hobbs Act'sjurisdictional elements). For example, if a statute prohibited running a
traffic light on an Indian reservation, the reservation requirementwouldbejurisdictionalwhereas
the elements comprising the act of running a traffic lightwould be substantive. See United States
v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 690 n.24 (1975) (describing example of running traffic light on Indian
reservation and categorizing "Indian reservation" requirement asjurisdictional element). Labeling
a requirement "jurisdictional" does not strip the requirement of its full importance as an element
of the offense that Congress intended to define and to punish. See id. at 676 n.9 (analyzing effect
ofjurisdictional element onprosecutor's burdens). "Indeed, arequirement is sufficient to confer
jurisdiction onthefederal courts forwhatotherwise arestate crimes precisely becauseitimplicates
factors that are... appropriate subject[s] for federal concern." Id. Affecting interstate commerce
is such afactor. See infra notes 65-88 and accompanyingtext(describing interstate commerce ele-
ments). For purposes of this Note, the term "jurisdictional element," when used to define an
elementofacrime, refers to therequirementoften included within federal criminal statutes thatthe
defendant's actions affected interstate commerce.
31. See infra Part V (describing effect ofjury instruction).
32. See infra notes 48-56, 65-130 and accompanying text (describing Hobbs Act's ele-
ments and instructions). The author recognizes that his choice of statutes simplifies the analysis
considerably in thatthe Supreme Court has previously recognized that thejurisdictional element
of proving an effect on interstate commerce is an essential element of the Hobbs Act. See
Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960) (analyzing Hobbs Act elements); see also
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contains both a substantive and a jurisdictional element. Part II.A identifies
both Hobbs Act elements,3 and Part II.B categorizes the instructions that
courts typically use in defining the jurisdictional element for the jury.34
Several distinct areas of law provide necessary background to assist in under-
standing the extent and significance of the constitutional deprivations at issue.
The first legal issue, described in Part II, is the federalization-of-crime
phenomenon.35 An ever-increasing subset of criminal activity, traditionally
prohibited under state law, now faces proscriptions under concurrent federal
law.36 Part III.A traces the modem federalization trend from its traditional
roots forward.3 7 ThisNote, in PartHL.B, introduces an important repercussion
of Congress expanding its criminal reach, that the federalization of crime
stretches Congress's authority, possibly beyond constitutional limits.3" The
Part identifies the source of congressional criminal authority 9 and defines the
limits of that authority.40 Part Il.C explains why uncertainty concerning the
scope of Congress's authority gives Congress incentive to include jurisdic-
tional elements in criminal statutes.4 1 Part IV refocuses the discussion on the
defendant's rights to jury trial.42 Part IV also examines the guarantees of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution with an emphasis on the
jury's role in determining the ultimate question of guilt in the criminal trial.43
United States v. Wells, 117 S. Ct. 921, 924-25 (1997) (finding that Gaudin does not apply if
element that court removes from jury is not element of crime). Although the analysis holds true
in criminal prosecutions under any statute, especially one in which the jurisdictional element
of affecting interstate commerce is at issue, proof that the interstate commerce element is an
essential element of the crime must first be proffered. See infra text accompanying note 237
(providing syllogism).
33. See infra notes 45-88 and accompanying text (discussing Hobbs Act elements).
34. See infra notes 89-130 and accompanying text (discussing Hobbs Act instructions).
35. See infra notes 131-213 and accompanying text (describing federalization of crime
phenomenon).
36. See infra notes 131-68 and accompanying text (describing federalization of crime
trend).
37. See infra notes 131-68 and accompanying text (describing history of state and federal
criminal prohibitions).
38. See infra notes 169-201 and accompanying text (describing effect of federalization
of crime trend).
39. See infra notes 169-86 and accompanying text (identifying source of Congress's
power).
40. See infra notes 187-201 and accompanying text (describing constitutional limits on
Congress's authority).
41. See infra notes 202-13 and accompanying text (describing incentive to include
jurisdictional element).
42. Seeinfranotes2l4-42andaccompanyingtext(analyzingFifthandSixthAmendments).
43. See infra notes 214-42 and accompanying text (discussing Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments).
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In Part V, history converges on the present. The Note revisits the Fifth
Circuit's en banc handling of the Parker case and its affirmance of a jury
instruction that reserved the determination of a jurisdictional element for the
trialjudge, notwithstanding the fact that the Constitution requires that thejury
acquit the defendant unless it alone finds every element, including the juris-
dictional element, satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.'
II. The Hobbs Act
A. Elements
The Hobbs Act prohibits acts of extortion and robbery that in any way or
degree obstruct, delay, or affect interstate commerce or its instrumentalities.45
The Hobbs Act also reaches attempts and conspiracies that similarly disturb
commerce or its instrumentalities.46 Persons convicted of violating the federal
44. See infra notes 243-67 and accompanying text (discussing Parker).
45. Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994); see Deborah Jones Merritt, Commerce!, 94
MICH. L. REv. 674, 715 (1995) (describing Hobbs Act's reach). The entire text of the Hobbs
Act follows:
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or
attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any
person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation
of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both.
(b) As used in this section -
(1) The term "robbery" means the unlawful taking or obtaining of personal
property from the person or in the presence of another, against his will, by
means of actual or threatened force, or violence, or fear of injury, immediate or
future, to his person or property, or property in his custody or possession, or the
person or property of a relative or member of his family or of anyone in his
company at the time of the taking or obtaining.
(2) The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from another, with
his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or
fear, or under color of official right.
(3) The term "commerce" means commerce within the District ofColumbia,
or any Territory or Possession of the United States; all commerce between any
point in a State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and any
point outside thereof; all commerce between points within the same State
through any place outside such State; and all other commerce over which the
United States has jurisdiction.
(c) This section shall not be construed to repeal, modify or affect section 17 of
Title 15, sections 52, 101-115, 151-166 of Title 29 or sections 151-188 of Title 45.
18 U.S.C. § 1951.
46. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951; see also United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 558 (7th Cir.
1995) (describing prosecution on conspiracy to extort theory); United States v. Dunn, 758 F.2d
30, 37-39 (1 st Cir. 1985) (describing prosecution for conspiracy and attempt to extort); Merritt,
supra note 45, at 715 (discussing reach of Hobbs Act).
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION IN THE JURYBOX
statute face a maximum penalty of a substantial fine plus twenty years impris-
onment.4 7
Congress included two essential elements in the definition of a Hobbs
Act crime.48 First, the defendant must commit robbery or extortion.49 Second,
the defendant's activity must in any way or degree obstruct, delay, or affect
interstate commerce. 0 The first element encompasses the substantive crimi-
nal aspect of the crime, whereas the second element defines the jurisdictional
limits." Both elements are proven only by reference to specific conduct.5 2
The Hobbs Act explicitly defines the substantive element of robbery or
extortion. 3 Robbery, under the Act, involves theft of property from a person
47. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). As originally adopted, the Hobbs Act capped at $10,000
the fine that courts may impose on violators. Hobbs Act, ch. 645, § 195 1(a), 62 Stat. 683, 793
(1948) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1994)). The amended version removed the
maximum. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).
48. See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960) (defining elements). Stirone
involved the prosecution of a defendant who had affected interstate commerce by extortion. See
id (presenting facts). The Supreme Court determined:
T]here are two essential elements of a Hobbs Act crime: interference with com-
merce, and extortion. Both elements have to be charged. Neither is surplusage and
neither can be treated as surplusage. The charge that interstate commerce is
affected is critical since the Federal Government's jurisdiction of this crime rests
only on that interference.
Id. Stirone did not involve robbery. See id. (discussing elements). If the Government had
alleged that Stirone had robbed instead of extorted from his victim, then the two essential
elements would have been interference with commerce and robbery. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)
(providing elements).
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (defining Hobbs Act crime); see also infra notes 53-56 and
accompanying text (describing substantive elements); Stirone, 361 U.S. at 218 (finding
extortion to be essential element of Hobbs Act violation); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d
320, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1982) (describing elements). In Billups, the Fourth Circuit noted that
robbery and extortion are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Id. at 331.
50. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (defining Hobbs Act crime); infra notes 65-88 and accompa-
nying text (describing jurisdictional element); see also Stirone, 361 U.S. at 218 (determining
that interference with commerce is essential element of Hobbs Act that trial court must charge
to jury).
51. See Charles N. Whitaker, Note, Federal Prosecution of State and Local Bribery:
Inappropriate Tools and the Need for a Structured Approach, 78 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1630
(1992) (acknowledging that both elements of Hobbs Act are extremely broad); see also supra
note 30 (defining types of elements); infra Part III.C (describing reasons for including jurisdic-
tional element).
52. See United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 835-37 (5th Cir. 1971) (analyzing facts
alleged to determine if they demonstrate conduct sufficient to satisfy interstate commerce
element).
53. See United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371,377-78 & n.8 (1978) (describing statutory
definitions and refusing to read "racketeering" into statute as essential element of crime); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (establishing definitions); Whitaker, supra note 51, at 1630 (analyzing
definitions). In Culbert, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress carefully chose explicit
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by use of force or threats and without the victim's consent. 4 Extortion
includes any wrongful taking of property from another by consent if the
consent is induced by use of force or threats.5 Both definitions mirror the
common law.56
Congress passed the Hobbs Act in response to the Supreme Court's
restrictive interpretation of the Act's predecessor statute:57 the Anti-Racke-
teering Act of 1934. Congress intended to broaden the Anti-Racketeering
Act and to overrule legislatively the Court's restrictive interpretation. 9 Since
definitions in order to preclude court interpretations that might narrow the scope of the Act. See
Culbert, 435 U.S. at 378 (quoting 91 CONG. REC. 11,904 (1945) (statement of Rep. Hancock)).
54. See Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1) (1994) (defining robbery).
55. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (defining extortion).
56. See WAYNER. LAFAVE& AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW §§ 8.11-. 12 (2d ed.
1986) (defining robbery and extortion at common law); see also James Lindgren, The Elusive
Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion: From the Common Law to the Hobbs Act, 35
UCLA L. REV. 815, 889-90 (1988) (analyzing Hobbs Act through common law and thirteenth-
century extortion statutes). The common law elements of robbery include: 1) larceny, 2) that
the property is taken from the person or presence of another, and 3) that the taking is accom-
plished by means of force or putting in fear. LAFAvE, supra, § 8.11. The common law
definition of extortion is the "corrupt taking of a fee by a public officer, under color of his
office, where no fee is due, or not so large a fee is due, or the fee is not yet due." Id. § 8.12.
57. See United States v. Rosa, 560 F.2d 149, 153 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1977) (calling enactment
Congress's response to restrictive reading ofAnti-Racketeering Act); see also Culbert, 435 U.S.
at 376 (finding no racketeering element in Hobbs Act even though statute enacted to correct
deficiency in Anti-Racketeering Act); United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 401-04 (1973)
(same); Charles F.C. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Corruption: A Case Study in the Making of
Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEo. L.J. 1171, 1174-75 (1977). The Hobbs Act's legislative
history confirms that Congress passed the statute in response to a restrictive Supreme Court
interpretation of the Anti-Racketeering Act. See 91 CONG. REC. 11,900 (1945) (statement of
Rep. Bulwinkle) (discussing intent of statute). Chairman of the House Committee on Labor,
Rep. Bulwinkle said, "[T]his bill is made necessary by the amazing decision of the Supreme
Court in the case of the United States against Teamster's Union 807 [United States v. Local
807, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521 (1942)], 3 years ago. That decision
practically nullified the antiracketeering bill of 1934." Id.
58. Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979 (1934) (amended 1948).
59. See United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371,376 (1978) (statingjustification for Hobbs
Act's passage); Enmons, 410 U.S. at 401-04 (same); Rosa, 560 F.2d at 153 & n.3 (same); see
also 91 CONG. REc. 11,900 (1945) (statement of Rep. Bulwinkle) (same). Rep. Bulwinkle
added: "We think a mistake was made by the Supreme Court, we are attempting to correct it
through enacting a new law which will accurately and definitely reflect the attitude of the
Congress, the general public and the honest, law-abiding members of labor unions." Id. The
Congressman referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Teamsters. See id. (referring
explicitly to Teamsters decision). In Teamsters, the issue was whether the Anti-Racketeering
Act exempted union members from prosecution. Teamsters, 315 U.S. at 527-28. The Govern-
ment proffered evidence tending to show that Teamsters officials had conspired to use violence
and threats in order to extort money from out-of-state drivers entering New York to make
deliveries. Id. at 525-26. The Teamsters stopped truckers at the state border and demanded
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the Hobbs Act's passage, courts have allowed evidence of Congress's initial
expansive purpose to justify interpreting the statute to its broadest extent.60
Every state prohibits both robbery and extortion6 2 under its own crimi-
money to "assist" with the drivers' deliveries. Id. at 526. The Supreme Court determined that
the payoff amounted to wages received from a bona-fide employer. Id. at 535. Pointing to
language within the Anti-Racketeering Act, the Court held that the act exempted the use of force
to acquire a wage and reversed the Teamsters officials' convictions. Id. at 531.
60. See Stironev. UnitedStates, 361 U.S. 212,215 (1960) (findingthat Congress intended
to use all of its constitutional power); see also United States v. Mattson, 671 F.2d 1020, 1023
(7th Cir. 1982) (stating that Hobbs Act"is to be given an expansive construction"); United States
v. Caci, 401 F.2d 664,668 (2d Cir. 1968) (finding that legislative history of Hobbs Act supports
broad reading). But see Steven C. Yarbrough, The Hobbs Act in the Nineties: Confusion or
Clarification of the Quid Pro Quo Standard in Extortion Cases Involving Public Officials, 31
TULSA L.J. 781,784 (1996) (asserting that courts gain little guidance from Hobbs Act legislative
debates concerning breadth of "under the color of official right" language in statute). The
Second Circuit's analysis in Caciprovides a clear example of the difficulty courts have interpret-
ing Congressional intent. See Caci, 401 F.2d at 668 (analyzing Congressional intent). The court
acknowledged that labor advocates believed that the bill unfairly targeted organized labor. See
id. (citing 91 CoNG. REc. 11,848 (1945) (statements of Rep. Lane); 91 CONG. REC. 11,901
(1945) (statements ofRep. Celler)). The courtthen recognized the arguments thatthe Hobbs Act
was to apply to all individuals and groups, see id. (citing 91 CONG. REC. 11,844 (1945) (state-
ments of Reps. Robsion and Michener); 91 CONG. REC. 11,904 (1945) (statements of Rep.
Gwynne); 91 CoNG. REc. 11,905 (1945) (statements of Rep. Robsion)), and that state laws
traditionally prohibited robbery and extortion, see id. (citing 91 CONG. REc. 11,910 (1945)
(statements of Reps. Springer and Robsion)). The foregoing would seem to indicate merely that
Congress intended to close the labor loophole without specifically targeting labor unions, not
that Congress intended an extremely broad reading of the Hobbs Act. See supra notes 57-59
(discussing Congress's intent and Court's response). However, the Caci court concluded:
"RThe legislative history clearly indicate[d] that Congress deliberately enacted a broad statute
designed to apply to all robbery and extortion which affected commerce." Caci, 401 F.2d at 668.
61. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-8-40 to -43 (1994) (prohibiting robbery); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 11.41.500-.510 (Michie 1996) (same); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1902 to -1904 (West
1989) (same); ARK. CODEANN. §§ 5-12-101 to -103 (Michie 1997) (same); CAL. PENAL CODE
§§ 211-215 (West 1988 & Supp. 1998) (same); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-4-301 to -304
(West 1997) (same); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-133 to -136a (West 1994 & Supp. 1997)
(same); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 831-832 (1995 & Supp. 1997) (same); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 812.13-.135 (West 1994) (same); GA.CoDEANN. §§ 16-8-40to-41 (1996) (same);HAW.REv.
STAT. §§ 708-840 to-842 (1993) (same); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-6501 to -6503 (1997) (same); 720
ILL. COMP. STAT.ANN. 5/18-1 to-5 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997) (same); IND.CODEANN. §§ 35-42-
5-1 to -2 (Michie 1994) (same); IOWA CoDEANN. §§ 711.1-•3 (West 1993) (same); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 21-3426 to -3427 (1995) (same); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 515.010-.030 (Michie 1990)
(same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:65 to :65.1 (West 1997) (same); ME.REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-
A, § 651 (West 1983) (same); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 486-489 (1996) (same); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 265, §§ 17, 19 (West 1990 & Supp. 1997) (same); MICH. COM. LAWS ANN.
§§ 750.529-.531 (West 1991) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.24-.245 (West 1987 & Supp.
1997) (same); Miss. CODEANN. §§ 97-3-73 to-81 (1994) (same); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 569.020-
.030 (West 1979 & Supp. 1998) (same); MONT. CODEANN. § 45-5-401(1997) (same);NEB.REV.
STAT. § 28-324 (1995) (same);NEv.REv. STAT. § 200.380 (1997) (same);N.H.REv. STAT.ANN.
§ 636:1 (1996) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:15-1 to -2 (West 1995) (same);N.M. STAT. ANN.
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nal laws.63 Thus, the broad language that Congress used when defining Hobbs
§ 30-16-2 (Michie 1994) (same); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 160.00-.15 (McKinney 1988 & Supp.
1998) (same);N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-87 to -89.1 (1993) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-01
(1997) (same); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2911.01-.02 (Banks-Baldwin 1997) (same); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 791-801 (West 1983 & Supp. 1998) (same); OR.REv. STAT. §§ 164.395-
.415(1995) (same); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.ANN. § 3701 (West 1983) (same); RI. GEN.LAWS §§ 11-
39-1 to-2(1994) (same); S.C. CODEANN. §§ 16-11-325to-330 (LawCo-op. Supp. 1997)(same);
S.D. CODiFiEDLAWS §§ 22-30-1 to -7 (Michie 1988) (same); TENN. CODEANN. §§ 39-13-401 to
-404 (1997) (same); TEX.PENALCODEANN. §§ 29.01-.03 (West 1994) (same); UTAHCODEANN.
§§ 76-6-301 to -302 (1995 & Supp. 1997) (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 608 (1974 & Supp.
1997) (same); VA.CODEANN. §§ 18.2-58to-58.1 (Michie 1996) (same); WASH.REV.CODEANN.
§§ 9A.56.190-.210 (West 1988) (same); W.VA. CODE§ 61-2-12 (1997) (same); Wis. STAT.ANN.
§ 943.32 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997) (same); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-401 (Michie 1997) (same).
62. SeeALA.CODE§ 13A-8-13 (1994) (prohibiting extortion); ALASKASTAT. § 11.41.520
(Michie 1996) (same); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1804 (West 1989) (same); ARK. CODEANN.
§ § 5-36-102 to -103 (Michie 1997) (prohibiting extortion under consolidated theft statute); CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 518-527 (West 1988 & Supp. 1998) (prohibiting extortion); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18-3-207 (West 1997) (same); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-1 19, 53a-121 to -125b
(West 1994 & Supp. 1997) (prohibiting extortion under larceny statute); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 846 (1995) (prohibiting extortion); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 839.11 (West Supp. 1998)
(prohibiting extortion by state officer); GA. CODEANN. § 16-8-16 (1996) (prohibiting extor-
tion); HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 707-764 to -767 (1993) (same); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-2401 to -2410
(1997) (prohibiting extortion under consolidated theft statute); 721 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/16-
I to -15 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997) (same); IND. CODEANN. § 35-45-2-1 (Michie Supp. 1997)
(prohibiting extortion under intimidation statute); IOWA CODE ANN. § 711.4 (West 1993)
(prohibiting extortion); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4401 (1995) (prohibiting extortion under
racketeering statute); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 514.080 (Michie Supp. 1996) (prohibiting
extortion); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:66 (West 1997) (same); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 355 (West 1983) (same); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 561-563 (1996 & Supp. 1997) (same);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 25 (West 1990) (same); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 750.213-.214 (West 1991) (same); MINN. STAT.ANN. §§ 609.27-.275 (West 1987) (prohibit-
ing extortion under coercion statute); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-82 (1994) (prohibiting extor-
tion); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 570.010-.070 (West 1979 & Supp. 1998) (prohibiting extortion under
stealing statute); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-6-301 (1997) (prohibiting extortion under theft
statute); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-513 (1995) (prohibiting extortion); NEV. REV. STAT. § 197.170
(1997) (same); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 637:1 to :5 (1996) (prohibiting under consolidated
theft statute); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:20-2, -5 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997) (same); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-16-9 (Michie 1994) (prohibiting extortion); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 155.05 (McKinney
1988) (prohibiting extortion under larceny statute); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.4 (1993)
(prohibiting extortion); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-23-01 to -10 (1997) (prohibiting extortion
under consolidated theft statute); OHIO REV. CODEANN. §§ 2905.11-. 12 (Banks-Baldwin 1997)
(prohibiting extortion and coercion); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1481-1487 (West 1983 &
Supp. 1998) (prohibiting extortion); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 164.015-.067, .075 (1995) (prohibiting
extortion under consolidated theft statute); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3923 (West 1983)
(same); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-42-4 (1994) (prohibiting threats against and extortion from public
officials); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-640 (Law Co-op. 1985) (prohibiting blackmail); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-30A-1, -4, -15, -1.7, -18 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1997) (prohibiting
extortion under consolidated theft statute); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-112 (1997) (prohibiting
extortion); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 31.02-.03 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998) (prohibiting
extortion under consolidated theft statute); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-401 to -406 (1995)
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Act offenses, coupled with the expansive interpretation courts have given it,
has resulted in a broad system of concurrent jurisdiction between state and
federal authorities - a system that places those committing robbery and
extortion in simultaneous violation of state and federal laws.'
The Hobbs Act's second element requires that the defendant's extortion
or robbery obstruct, delay, or affect interstate commerce. 5 Congress intended
the element to track the Commerce Clause's language and, therefore, to allow
the Hobbs Act to reach any extortion and robbery that "affected interstate
commerce" as the Constitution defines that term.' Courts have favored a
(same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1701 (Supp. 1997) (prohibiting extortion); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.2-470 (Michie 1996) (same); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.56.110-.130 (West 1988)
(same); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-13 (1997) (same); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 943.30 to .31 (West 1996)
(prohibiting extortion as threat to injure or to accuse of crime); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-402
(Michie 1997) (prohibiting extortion under blackmail statute).
63. See United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 379-80 (1978) (discussing concurrent
jurisdiction of Hobbs Act). The Culbert Court suggested that Congress believed that the states
had not effectively prosecuted robbery and extortion. Id. at380 (quoting 91 CoNG. REc. 11,911
(1945) (statements of Rep. Jennings)).
64. See Whitaker, supra note 51, at 1626 (noting that Hobbs Act's broad jurisdictional
trigger may allow courts to apply Act to purely local behavior). The dual sovereignty was not
lost on many of Congress's state's rights advocates during Congressional debates on the Hobbs
Act. See 91 CONG. REC. 11,903 (1945) (statement of Rep. Welch) (arguing for bill's rejection).
Rep. Welch argued:
Every State, city, and county in the United States has ample State and local
laws to meet this situation [prosecuting robbery and extortion]. It is difficult to
understand why Members of Congress, whose entire records as national legislators
have been based upon the principle of State's rights, now stand up here and attempt
to fasten upon the Federal Government the responsibility of enforcing local law in
every city, village, and hamlet in the Nation. This is not'a Federal Government
function. I would be ashamed to stand here on the floor of Congress and admit that
I represented such a district.
Id
65. See Stironev. United States, 361 U.S. 212,218 (1960) (defining elements of Hobbs
Act crime).
66. See 91 CoNG. REc. 11,900 (1945) (statement of Rep. Jennings) (discussing purpose
of Hobbs Act). Jennings stated: "[Tihis bill is designed to protect trade and commerce against
interference by violence, threat, coercion, or intimidation. It is brought before the Congress
under and pursuant to the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution which gives Congress
the power to regulate commerce among the States." Id. Rep. Hancock, one of the Hobbs Act's
chief sponsors, said the bill had a single purpose: "It is the function of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce, and it is the duty of Congress to protect interstate commerce. That is the
object of this bill, and there is not any other." 91 CONG. REc. 11,900 (1945) (statement of Rep.
Hancock). Congress's jurisdiction over the Hobbs Act's subject matter is, in fact, based on its
Commerce Clause authority. See United States v. Alexander, 850 F.2d 1500, 1503 (1 1th Cir.
1988) (calling interstate commerce element "jurisdictional prerequisite"); United States v.
Varlack, 225 F.2d 665, 670 (2d Cir. 1955) (analyzing sufficiency of indictment charging
obstruction of commerce alone rather than interstate or foreign commerce); see also Nick v.
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broad interpretation of the jurisdictional element.67 In fact, few defendants
have successfully defended against Hobbs Act prosecutions by arguing. that
the alleged activity had no effect on interstate commerce." Indeed, courts
have decided that any effect on interstate commerce satisfies the Hobbs Act,
even if that effect is slight,69 de minimis," or even only potential.71 Moreover,
United States, 122 F.2d 660, 668 (8th Cir. 1941) (addressing predecessor act). In Nick, the
petitioner sought to attack the validity of the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934, ch. 569, 48 Stat.
979 (1934) (amended 1948), the HobbsAct's predecessor, on Tenth Amendment grounds. Nick
122 F.2d at 667. The petitioner in Nick claimed that the Anti-Racketeering Act improperly
asserted jurisdiction over activity previously prohibited under state law. Id. at 668. The court
agreed that state law prohibited extortion and robbery, but found that, to the extent that the
activity came within the Commerce Clause, theTenthAmendmentwould not prohibit concurrent
federal prohibition. Id. "The Act is an exercise of police power but it is based upon the protec-
tion of interstate commerce." Id. The Varlackcourt echoedNick's conclusion while specifically
considering the Hobbs Act: "There can be no doubt that congressional jurisdiction to enact this
statute is bottomed upon the powers conferred upon the national legislature by the Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Clause of the Constitution, Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3." Varlack, 225 F.2d at 669-70.
67. See Stirone, 361 U.S. at 215 (finding that Congress intended full application ofCom-
merce Clause authority); United States v. Alexander, 850 F.2d 1500, 1503 (1 1th Cir. 1988)
(stating that "[tihe government's burden under this requirement is not great"); United States v.
Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 836 (5th Cir. 1971) (rejecting contention that impact on interstate com-
merce must be substantial); United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1076 (2d Cir. 1969)
(finding that broad interpretation routinely upheld (citing United States v. Amabile, 395 F.2d
47 (7th Cir. 1968); Battagliav. United States, 383 F.2d 303 (9th Cir. 1967); Hulahan v. United
States, 214 F.2d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 1954); United States v. Malinsky, 19 F.R.D. 426, 428
(S.D.N.Y. 1956))). In Stirone, the Court considered the broad language that Congress included
in the Hobbs Act. Stirone, 361 U.S. at 215. "The Act speaks in broad language, manifesting
a purpose to use all the constitutional power Congress has to punish interference with interstate
commerce by extortion, robbery or physical violence. The Act outlaws such interference 'in any
way ordegree."' Id. at215 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1994)). Courts analyzingthejurisdic-
tional basis have routinely upheld the Hobbs Act against constitutional attacks. See United States
v. Williams, 621 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1980) (recognizing that courts have sustained Hobbs
Act against constitutional attacks); see also United States v. Postma, 242 F.2d 488,493 (2d Cir.
1957) (affirming constitutionality of Hobbs Act). See generally United States v. Varlack, 225
F.2d 665, 669 (2d Cir. 1955) (upholding Hobbs Act against Tenth Amendment attack).
68. See Whitaker, supra note 51, at 1630 (analyzing effect of broad jurisdictional
element). Whitaker suggests that the Hobbs Act's jurisdictional element is too broad to argue
successfully against it in defense. See id. "Consequently, defendants charged under the Hobbs
Act are rarely acquitted onjurisdictional grounds. Instead, defense arguments must concentrate
on the substantive elements of the crime." Id. Full application of the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ments' right to jury trial would likely change the legal dynamic because juries may be more
likely to acquit based on their own determination of what interstate commerce really entails.
See United States v. Bongiomno, 106 F.3d 1027, 1031 (1st Cir. 1997) (recognizing that court
and jury have different definitions of interstate commerce). In Bongiorno, the First Circuit
recognized that "[tihe term 'commerce' in the Commerce Clause context is a term of art, and
the Court consistently has interpreted it to include transactions that might strike lay persons as
'noncommercial."' Id.
69. See United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371,373 (1978) (finding effect "in any way
or degree" to be enough); see also United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014,1023 (8th Cir. 1978)
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although depleting the assets of an entity involved in interstate commerce is
deemed sufficient to satisfy the element,72 the effect on commerce need not be
adverse.
73
The amphibious nature of the interstate commerce element has perhaps
exacerbated the relaxation of the element's legal proof requirements.74 The
(affirming conviction of extortionist whose victim paid $5,000 from personal accounts).
70. See United States v. Debs, 949 F.2d 199, 202 (6th Cir. 1991) (allowing de minimis
effect); see also United States v. DiCarlantonio, 870 F.2d 1058, 1060 (6th Cir. 1989) (same);
United States v. Alexander, 850 F.2d 1500, 1503 (11th Cir. 1988) (same); United States v.
Conn, 769 F.2d 420, 424 (7th Cir. 1985) (allowing de minimis effect if not "speculative or
attenuated"); United States v. Billups, 692 F.2d 320,331 n.7 (4th Cir. 1982) (finding sufficient
effect from $4000 actual value of extortion and $10,000 potential); United States v. Glynn, 627
F.2d 39, 41 (7th Cir. 1980) (allowing de minimis effect); United States v. Gerald, 624 F.2d
1291, 1299 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that "minimal effect on interstate commerce will sustain
jurisdiction under the statute").
71. See United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 558 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that agreement
to accept bribe had potential to affect interstate commerce even though bribe never paid);
United States v. Morgano, 39 F.3d 1358, 1371 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding "potential" enough
because Hobbs Act reaches Congress's full constitutional power); United States v. Peete, 919
F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that"realistic probability" of effect would suffice);
United States v. Buffey, 899 F.2d 1402, 1404 (4th Cir. 1990) (requiring reasonably probable
effect); United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 60 (7th Cir. 1975) (finding requirement satisfied
even if "no actual effect on commerce").
72. See United States v. Collins, 40 F.3d 95, 99-100 (5th Cir. 1994) (analyzing suffi-
ciency of depletion of assets theory); see also United States v. Jackson, 748 F.2d 1535, 1537
(1 th Cir. 1984) (defining depletion of assets theory). The Jackson court defined the depletion
of assets theory as follows: "Under that theory, 'commerce is affected when an enterprise,
which either is actively engaged in interstate commerce or customarily purchases items in
interstate commerce, has its assets depleted through extortion, thereby curtailing the victim's
potential as a purchaser of such goods."' a d (quoting United States v. Elders, 569 F.2d 1020,
1025 (7th Cir. 1978)); see also United States v. Zeigler, 19 F.3d 486,489-90 (10th Cir. 1994)
("The minimal effect on commerce may be established by evidence of a mere depletion of assets
of a firm engaged in interstate commerce."). The depletion of assets theory is widely accepted.
See United States v. Blakey, 607 F.2d 779, 783-84 (7th Cir. 1979) (noting that depletion of
assets theory is well-established in precedent); see also United States v. Morgano, 39 F.3d 1358,
1371-72 (7th Cir. 1994) (analyzing sufficiency of depletion of assets theory); United States v.
DiCarlantonio, 870 F.2d 1058, 1060 (6th Cir. 1989) (applying depletion of assets theory);
United States v. Glynn, 627 F.2d 39, 41 (7th Cir. 1980) (rejecting contention that depletion of
assets theory is insufficient); United States v. Biondo, 483 F.2d 635, 640 (8th Cir. 1973)
(calling acceptability of depletion of assets theory "well settled").
73. See United States v. Bailey, 990 F.2d 119, 126 (4th Cir. 1993) (rejecting appellant's
claim that effect must be adverse to commerce). In Bailey, the appellant pointed to language
in prior cases that mentioned that the effect on interstate commerce must be adverse. Id. at 125.
The court acknowledged that UnitedStates v. De Parias, 805 F.2d 1447, 1450 (1 th Cir. 1986)
and United States v. Buffey, 899 F.2d 1402, 1403 (4th Cir. 1990) described the interstate
commerce effect as "adverse," but rejected appellant's claim after finding that the language in
both cited cases was merely dicta and therefore not binding. Bailey, 990 F.2d at 125.
74. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text (describing legal proof requirements).
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interstate commerce element does not fit easily into well-defined evidence
categories.75 Courts have struggled to determine whether the element presents
a question of law, a question of fact, or a mixed question of fact and law.76
Determining the proper category is essential to the ultimate question of who
must decide whether the element is satisfied; ordinarily, juries determine
facts, and judges determine law.'
The importance of the "affecting interstate commerce" element goes
beyond-mere formalism; the element defines the very limits of the statute's
jurisdictional parameters.8 The interstate commerce element does not depend
upon the culpability of the defendant;79 rather, the element reflects constitu-
75. See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAW 183 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1898) (noting that classification of evidence
into categories is necessary). Thayer introduces two categories - questions of law and ques-
tions of fact - into which courts must place elements. See id. (defining categories). The
affecting interstate commerce element appears to be a mix of fact and law. See infra notes 78-
88 and accompanying text (analyzing jurisdictional element). For an excellent illustration of
the confusion the interstate commerce element raises, compare UnitedStates v. Hyde, 448 F.2d
815, 839-43 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding that every court agrees that interstate commerce element
is one forjudge to determine) with id. at 850-63 (Rives, J., dissenting) (challenging majority's
categorization).
76. See Hyde, 448 F.2d at 850-63 (Rives, J., dissenting) (addressing whether interstate
commerce element may be reserved for judge as question of law or must be charged to jury as
question of fact or mixed question of fact and law).
77. See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text (describing role ofjury and judge as
concerning fact and law). The command often is translated into the Latin phrase that Sir
Edward Coke employed: "Ad quwstionem facti non respondent judices, ad questionem juris
non respondent juratores." See, e.g., I SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 81 (f) (I 6th ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1899); THAYERsupra note 75, at 183;
JAMES BRADLEYTHAYER, A SELECTION OF CASES ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 135 (2d
ed. 1900); and GEORGE WORTHINGTON, AN INQUIRY INTO THE POWER OF JURIES TO DECIDE
INCIDENTALLY ON QUESTIONS OF LAW §§ 129, 132 (Philadelphia, J.S. Littell 1840). Inciden-
tally, Lord Coke is recognized as "the greatest jurist of the seventeenth century." Brian P.
Levack, Possession, Witchcraft, and the Law in Jacobean England, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1613, 1613 (1995).
78. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (defining interstate commerce element
and tracing its origins to Commerce Clause).
79. See United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522,527-28 (9th Cir. 1995) (question-
ing decision to prosecute arson defendant in federal court when defendant could have been
prosecuted in state court). In Pappadopoulos, the defendant was convicted of setting fire to a
home "used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate orforeign
commerce." Id. at 524. The only link the home had to interstate commerce was that it received
natural gas for its heat through interstate means. Id at 525, 528. The court found that the
defendant violated the substantive aspects of the statute, but determined that the interstate
commerce connection was insufficient. Id. at 528. Reversing the defendant's conviction, the
court did not state that the defendant had not committed arson, but that prosecutors chose the
wrong jurisdiction in which to bring their charges:
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tional interpretation of the Commerce Clause as applied to the facts ofindivid-
ual cases.80 Although questions involving constitutional interpretation are
ordinarily questions of law for the court and not thejury to decide,8" Congress
deliberately chose to make the requirement that the defendant affect interstate
commerce an essential element of a Hobbs Act violation." Proving the nec-
essary effect on interstate commerce requires evidence that proffered histori-
cal facts are true. 3 Deciding such questions of fact is the jury's job alone."
The problem thus reveals itself: the requirement that the defendant
affected interstate commerce involves questions both of law and of fact;8" the
This is a simple state arson crime. It should have been tried in state court. But
the question goes beyond federalism concerns-it involves ourjurisdiction. Where
the sole source of the interstate commerce connection is the receipt by a private
home of natural gas from a company that receives some of that gas from an out-of-
state source, federal jurisdictional requirements have not been met.
Id. The interstate commerce element produces similar results within the Hobbs Act context.
See Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994) (providing interstate commerce element in addition
to substantive elements). But see United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 855 (5th Cir. 1971)
(Rives, J., dissenting) (asserting that determination of guilt hinges on effect on interstate
commerce).
80. See Hyde, 448 F.2d at 839 & n.34 (stating that "this is a jurisdictional element for
which the court has a great responsibility"). The Hyde court advised trial courts to proceed
cautiously as they instruct juries on the Hobbs Act's interstate commerce element "because
interference with interstate commerce is the element of the conduct here that enabled Congress
to declare that common law extortion can be a federal crime." Id, at 839 n.34.
81. See J.C. WELLS, A TREATISE ON QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT, INSTRUCTIONs TO
JURiES AND BILLS OF EXCEPTONS § 64 (New ed., Des Moines, Mills 1879) (noting that court
properly determines constitutional issues); see also United States v. Keys, 103 F.3d 758, 761
(9th Cir. 1996) (same).
82. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (defining crime).
83. See Hyde, 448 F.2d at 839 n.34 (claiming that jurisdictional element in Hobbs Act
requires jury's determination of facts). The Hyde majority agreed with the dissent that "[a]t the
evidentiary stage of the trial there is nothing unique about the commerce issue as a 'jurisdic-
tional element."' Id. The opinion continues: "It is for the jury to determine whether the facts
have been proved, that is, whether they believe the evidence with respect to the factual elements
of the indictment as explained in the charge." Id at 839, 841; see also United States v.
Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205,1212 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that interstate commerce element
"is in fact a substantive element of the crime"), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1104 (1998). Of course,
if the jurisdictional element is treated similarly to the substantive elements, one would expect
the instructions on both to be similar; if the instructions for the substantive element allow the
jury to apply law to fact, then the instructions for the jurisdictional element should as well.
Compare Hyde, 448 F.2d at 839, 841 & n.34 (asserting that element is not unique) with Hyde,
448 F.2d at 839 n.34 (asserting jury is to determine whether facts are proved).
84. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511-12 (1995) (finding that facts are
properly reserved for juries to determine); see infra notes 214-22 and accompanying text
(discussing right to jury trial).
85. Compare supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing Hyde dissent's finding
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element does not purely belong to just one or the other category. 6 Courts
have recognized a third category for such elements - mixed questions of fact
and law." The Supreme Court has recently held that the jury alone must
determine questions falling into the "mixed" category."
B. Interstate Commerce Instructions
Jury instructions define the substantive law under which jury members
are to make their determinations of purely factual questions and of mixed
questions of fact and law." Instructions also allocate the responsibilities that
the judge and jury have in determining a defendant's guilt or innocence.'
Courts must correctly allocate such responsibilities because an error that
removes from the jury its duty to decide every element is an error of constitu-
tional magnitude.91
The United States Circuit Courts of Appeals disagree as to how a court
should instruct a jury concerning the Hobbs Act's interstate commerce ele-
ment.92 Courts, however, are in unanimous agreement on one critical point:
every court that has considered the merits has rejected the Hobbs Act defen-
of legal components in affecting interstate commerce element) with supra note 79 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Pappadopoulos's finding of factual components in affecting interstate
commerce element).
86. See THAYER, supra note 75, at 249-50 (defining mixed questions of fact and law); see
also Keys, 103 F.3d at 761 (defining mixed questions of fact and law). The Keys court stated:
"A mixed question of law and fact occurs when the historical facts are established, the rule of
law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the legal rule." Id.
87. See THAYER, supra note 75, at 249-50 (defining mixed questions of facts and law);
see also Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 512 (defining questions requiring "application-of-legal-standard-
to-fact" as mixed questions of law and fact).
88. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 512 (stating "the application-of-legal-standard-to-fact sort
of question .... commonly called a 'mixed question of'law and fact,' has typically been
resolved by juries" (citing THAYER, supra note 75, at 249-250)).
Curiously, Thayer rejected the suggestion that there was even a need for the "mixed
questions of law and fact" category. See THAYER, supra note 75, at 249. He classified mixed
questions as ones of fact for the jury to decide. Id. at 250.
89. See United States v. Hill, 417 F.2d 279, 281 (5th Cir. 1969) (describing purpose of
jury instructions).
90. See id. (defining goals of appropriate jury instructions).
91. See infra notes 214-22 and accompanying text (concluding that defendant's constitu-
tional right to jury trial requires jury determination that prosecution proved every element
beyond reasonable doubt).
92. Compare supra text accompanying note 102 (describing category I instruction), with
text accompanying note 113 (presenting category II instruction), and text accompanying note
120 (presenting category III instruction), andtext accompanying note 128 (describing category
IV instruction).
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dant's argument that the trial court's jury instruction improperly allowed the
judge to decide whether the prosecution satisfied the interstate commerce
element.93 Notably, courts have also rejected every contrary appeal - that a
93. See United States v. Hebert, 131 F.3d 514, 521 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding Parker
foreclosed appeal charging Gaudin-type error); United States v. Miles, 122 F.3d 235, 239-40
(5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (same); United States v. Castleberry, 116 F.3d 1384, 1389 (1 th
Cir.) (extending Gaudin to interstate commerce element, but determining that defendant was
"simply wrong in arguing that the jury in his case did not decide each element of his Hobbs Act
convictions"), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 341 (1997); United States v. Parker, 104 F.3d 72, 73 (5th
Cir.) (en banc) ("Having reviewed the record and the briefs and arguments of the parties, we
have determined thatthe trial court committed no Gaudin-type error."), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
1720 (1997); United States v. O'Malley, 796F.2d 891,897-98 (7th Cir. 1986) ("The instruction
informed the jury that it must find interstate commerce was affected if it determined that the
victims' businesses purchased goods in interstate commerce .... this jury instruction was
proper."); United States v. Curcio, 759 F.2d 237, 242 (2d Cir. 1985) ("The district court must
determine whether the evidence adduced is sufficient as a matter of law to fulfill the jurisdic-
tional requirement of the statute."); United States v. Calder, 641 F.2d 76,78 (2d Cir. 1981) ("It
was for the court to determine as a matter of law the jurisdictional question of whether the
alleged conduct affected interstate commerce; it was for the jury to determine whether the
alleged conducthad in fact occurred."); United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415,424 n.1 I (3d Cir.
1979) ("The districtjudge's ruling as a matter of law that commerce was affected if the requisite
facts were found by the jury is entirely proper."); United States v. Summers, 598 F.2d 450, 455-
57 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[District Judge] properly informed the jury that its sole role as trier of fact
was to determine whether they believed the government's evidence in this respect beyond a
reasonable doubt."); United States v. Hooper, 575 F.2d 496, 497-98 (5th Cir. 1978) ("This
approach is used rather than telling the jury in general terms what it means to affect commerce
and allowing the jury to determine whether the facts meet this criterion, because this is a
jurisdictional element for which the court has a great responsibility."); United States v. Kuta,
518 F.2d 947, 951-52 & n.6 (7th Cir. 1975) ("The defendant's argument fails to draw the
distinction between factual determinations which the jury must make, and the legal impact of
those determinations which the trial court is competentto evaluate."); United States v. Augello,
451 F.2d 1167, 1170 (2d Cir. 1971) ("The charge was correct; 'it was for the court, and notthe
jury, to determine whether the Government's evidence, if believed, would bring the activities
of the defendant within the statute and sustain federal jurisdiction."' (quoting Hulahan v. United
States, 214 F.2d 441, 446 (8th Cir. 1954)); United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 839-42 &
nn.34-37 (5th Cir. 1971) ("All of the Hobbs Act cases agree that the court should determine
whether the facts alleged meet the statutory requirement of affecting interstate commerce.");
United States v. Green, 246 F.2d 155, 160-61 (7th Cir. 1957) ("It was clearly the function of
the court to determine whether interstate commerce was affected and whether the court had
jurisdiction under the Act."); United States v. Lowe, 234 F.2d 919, 922-23 (3d Cir. 1956)
(considering charge that instructed jury, "if believed by you beyond a reasonable doubt [they]
satisfy the necessary federal jurisdictional element of interstate commerce under the law under
which this indictment is drawn"); United Statesv. Varlack, 225 F.2d 665,670-72 (2d Cir. 1955)
("[A]s amatter of law, thejurisdictional elements were present and the only questions left open
were whether the acts ofthe defendants constituted [substantive elements]."); Hulahanv. United
States, 214 F.2d 441,445-46 (8th Cir. 1954) ("We think it was for the court, and not the jury,
to determine whether the Government's evidence, if believed, would bring the activities of the
defendant within the statute and sustain federal jurisdiction."); United States v. Compagna, 146
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Hobbs Act instruction impermissibly allowed thejury to determine whether
the prosecution satisfied the interstate commerce element.94
A comprehensive survey of the rejected appeals reveals four distinct
categories of interstate commerce instructions.95 The relevant difference
between the categories is the degree of responsibility that the instructions allot
to the jury.96 The first category of instruction is extreme and therefore is
rarely utilized.97 The instruction completely removes the interstate commerce
element from the jury's consideration." Courts employing such instructions
justify their decision on the grounds that the interstate commerce element
pertains only to the jurisdiction of the court and is therefore purely a question
of law for the judge.99
In United States v. Compagna,'" the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit considered such an instruction.10' The court of appeals
F.2d 524, 527 (2d Cir. 1944) ("[T]he business was interstate as amatterof law, and the question
should not have been submitted to the jury."); Nick v. United States, 122 F.2d 660, 673 (8th
Cir. 1941) ("It is for the court to charge the jury that if certain facts covered by the evidence are
shown then there is such interference."). The cases cited are limited to those in which the
defendant raised the precise issue discussed in this Note. Additionally, one court did not
provide the trial court's instruction, but found that"[t]he question of whether a defendant's acts
satisfy thejurisdictional predicate of the Hobbs Act is one of law." United States v. Buffey, 899
F.2d 1402, 1407 (4th Cir. 1990). Moreover, two other opinions are relevant because they
provide the trial court's instruction, but the defendants did not object on the grounds analyzed
in this Note. United States v. Battaglia, 394 F.2d 304, 312 (7th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Kramer, 355 F.2d 891, 899-900 (7th Cir. 1966) ("[T]he charge in this case was not so inade-
quate that the jury could not determine the question fairly.").
94. United States v. Box, 50 F.3d 345, 353-54 (5th Cir. 1995) (rejecting appeal and
finding that instruction included implicit determination that allegations contained in indictment,
if true, would satisfy jurisdictional element); United States v. Jarrett, 705 F.2d 198,203-04 (7th
Cir. 1983) (rejecting appeal on findings that there was no prejudice to defendant and instruction
not objected to at trial, but not reaching issue of whether error occurred).
95. See infra text accompanying notes 102, 113, 120, 128 (providing four categories of
instructions).
96. See infra text accompanying notes 102, 113, 120, 128 (providing four categories of
instructions).
97. See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text (concluding that category I instruction
directs verdict against defendant).
98. See infra text accompanying note 102 (describing category I instruction).
99. See infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text (describing justification for category
I instruction); see also United States v. Gollin, 166 F.2d 123, 125-26 (3d Cir. 1947) (evaluating
category I instruction and reversing as partially directed verdict). Gollin did not involve a
prosecution under the Hobbs Act, but provided the common argument for withholding the
jurisdictional interstate commerce element from the jury. See id at 126 (explaining apparent
rationale for category I instruction).
100. 146 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1944).
101. See United States v. Compagna, 146 F.2d 524,527 (2d Cir. 1944) (analyzing category
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determined that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient as a matter of
law to satisfy the interstate commerce element and asserted that the jury need
not have any role in finding that the prosecution met its burden. 2 Although
later courts have cited Compagna favorably,0 3 none has issued an instruction
that has so explicitly directed a verdict on the interstate commerce element."°
Instructions in the second category allot little more responsibility to the
jury.0 5 The instruction allows the jury merely to determine the truth of the
facts proffered by Government witnesses on the interstate commerce
element.' °6 Courts employing such instructions tell jury members that if the
I instruction). In Compagna, one issue waswhetherthe interstate commerce element ofthe Anti-
Racketeering Act was assignable to the judge for his determination or whether the jury alone
carried the responsibility of finding every element satisfied before a conviction could obtain. Id.
at 525, 527. The defendant conspired to extort money from moving picture exhibitors. Id. at
526. He organized a union among the industry and threatened strikes and violence unless the
exhibitors paid him handsomely. Id In one decade, the defendant illegally raised more than
$1,100,000 from his victims. Id The unanimous majority determined as a "matter of law" that
interstate commere was affected. Id The court further determined that thejury should not have
any role in determining whether interstate commerce was affected and the element met. Id. at
527. Unfortunately, the court of appeals did not reprint the instruction. See id.
102. Id. (stating that conspiracy was "interstate as a matter of law"). The Compagna court
did not explicitly reveal if it was directly addressing whether the satisfaction of the interstate
commerce element was a question for the judge or jury; thus, the opinion might reflect merely
a determination that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. See id. Nonetheless, the
opinion's author, Judge Learned Hand, continued beyond a finding of mere sufficiency to a
pronouncement that "the question should not have been submitted to the jury." Id
103. See Hulahan v. United States, 214 F.2d 441, 446 (8th Cir. 1954) (citing Compagna
favorably).
104. But c. Gollin, 166 F.2d at 125 (evaluating category I instruction within another
similar statute and reversing as partially directed verdict). In Gollin, the trial judge delivered
the following instruction, in relevant part:
You are instructed that the Congress has provided that it is a criminal offense for
anyone to steal goods from a motor truck while in interstate or foreign commerce.
Under this state of facts you are instructed that as a matter of law the truck was
moving in interstate commerce at the time it is contended by the government that
the beer was stolen therefrom. That is a matter of law. The facts are not disputed
and that constitutes the jurisdiction of this court and is a matter for the court to
determine and not a matter for the jury to determine.
Id. Thus, the trial court directed thejury that it had no role in finding thejurisdictional element.
See id. (providing instruction). The Gollin court found that the jurisdictional determination
required a factual determination made by thejury, see id. at 126-27, yet the trial court removed
even the factual questions from the jury's consideration. Id. at 126. The court reversed the
defendant's conviction. Id at 127.
105. Compare supra text accompanying note 102 (describing category I instruction) with
infra text accompanying note 113 (presenting category II instruction).
106. See supra note 17 (providing text of Parker jury charge). Additionally, category II
instructions diverge into two distinct subgroups: those that enumerate the facts alleged by the
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Government's bare facts are true concerning the interstate commerce element,
then the Government has necessarily satisfied the element." 7 The judge
makes the determination as a matter of law that the prosecution has met its
burden and forbids the jury from applying facts to law." 8
In United States v. Calder,"° the Second Circuit considered an instruc-
tion within this category.' Joseph Calder and a friend were tried in the
Government and those that merely refer to the general subject matter of evidence the Govern-
ment alleges. See United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d 815, 842-43 (5th Cir. 1971) (approving
category IIA and II13 instructions and deferring choice to judge's discretion); see also United
States v. Sweet, 548 F.2d 198, 202-03 (7th Cir. 1977) (recognizing difference while contrasting
Hyde ihstruction with instruction given in prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (malicious
destruction by explosion of property used in interstate commerce)). For examples of instruc-
tions that specifically enumerate the evidence the Government alleges, see United States v.
Hebert, 131 F.3d 514, 521 (5th Cir. 1997) (providing instruction that enumerates specific facts
Government alleged that prove interstate commerce, if true, as matter of law); United States v.
Miles, 122 F.3d 235,239-40 (5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (same); UnitedStates v. Parker, 104
F.3d 72, 73 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (same), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1720 (1997); United States v.
O'Malley, 796 F.2d 891,897-98 (7th Cir. 1986) (same); UnitedStates v. Calder, 641 F.2d 76,
78 (2d Cir. 1981) (same); United States v. Cerilli, 603 F.2d 415, 424 n.11 (3d Cir. 1979)
(same); UnitedStates v. Lowe, 234 F.2d 919,922-23 (3d Cir. 1956) (same); Hulahan v. United
States, 214 F.2d 441,446 (8th Cir. 1954) (same); Nickv. United States, 122 F.2d 660, 673 (8th
Cir. 1941) (same). For examples of instructions that generally restate the subject matter of the
Government's evidence, see United States v. Castleberry, 116 F.3d 1384, 1387 (11th Cir.)
(providing instruction that restates general subject matter of evidence that must prove interstate
commerce effect, if true), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 341 (1997); United States v. Summers, 598
F.2d 450, 457 (5th Cir. 1979) (same); United States v. Hooper, 575 F.2d 496, 497 (5th Cir.
1978) (same); United States v. Kuta, 518 F.2d 947, 951-52 (7th Cir. 1975) (same); United
States v. Augello, 451 F.2d 1167, 1170 (2d Cir. 1971) (same); UnitedStates v. Hyde, 448 F.2d
815, 839 & n.34 (5th Cir. 1971) (same); UnitedStates v. Green, 246 F.2d 155, 160-61 (7th Cir.
1957) (same); United States v. Varlack 225 F.2d 665, 672 (2d Cir. 1955) (same).
107. See infra text accompanying note 113 (providing text of instruction); see also supra
note 17 (providing text of Parker instruction).
108. See infra text accompanying note 113 (providing text of instruction); see also supra
note 17 (providing text of Parker instruction).
109. 641 F.2d76(2dCir. 1981)
110. See United States v. Calder, 641 F.2d 76,78 (2d Cir. 1981) (providing text of instruc-
tion). In Calder, the court considered an instruction that allowed the jury merely to determine
whether the penultimate facts were true and reserved the ultimate determination for the judge.
See id. at 78 (providing text of instruction). The defendant, accompanied by a friend, extorted
$300 weekly from two midtown Manhattan bars. ld. at 77. His activities lasting over ayear, the
defendant extorted a total of approximately $15,000. Id. Following an FBI sting operation, the
defendant was arrested, tried under the Hobbs Act, and convicted. Id. at 77-78. Calder appealed
from his conviction on grounds that the evidence was insufficient to show a sufficient effect on
interstate commerce and that the jury instructions erroneously removed the interstate commerce
element from the jury. 1d. at 78. The Government introduced evidence that the bars routinely
purchased goods in interstate commerce, and the court, relying on the depletion of assets theory,
found that the evidence, if true, easily established an interstate commerce nexus. Id. The trial
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United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York for extorting
$300 per week from two Manhattan bars."' The prosecution alleged that the
defendant affected interstate commerce because the defendant depleted assets
that the bars otherwise would have used to purchase goods through interstate
commerce."' The trial judge subsequently instructed the jury that if it found
"beyond a reasonable doubt that the goods were purchased for [the bars] in
interstate or foreign commerce and that money or property was obtained from
them by extortion, then, as a matter of law, interstate or foreign commerce was
affected.""' Calder appealed his conviction on the grounds that the judge's
instruction imp ermissibly relieved the jury from deciding whether the Govern-
ment had satisfied the interstate commerce element."' The Second Circuit
rejected the appeal based upon the court's assertion that the interstate com-
merce element was a question of law for the court to decide because the
element involved ajurisdictional question." 5
Instructions in the third category differ from those in the second in one
important respect: Courts employing instructions in the second category
require the jury to find an effect on interstate commerce if it believes the
factual allegations, whereas instructions in the third category explicitly inform
the jury that the evidence would be sufficient to satisfy the element if the evi-
dence were true."6 Instructions in the third category allot more responsibility
to thejury than do those inthe second category, but still do not grantthejury full
responsibility for finding that the Government satisfied its burden of proof."7
In United States v. Kramer,"' the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit upheld an instruction of this type."9 At the close of evidence, the trial
judge had instructed the jury that if it found "beyond a reasonable doubt that the goods were
purchased for [the bars] in interstate or foreign commerce, and that money of property was
obtained from them by extortion then, as a matter of law, interstate commerce was affected." Id.
The court upheld the instruction, finding that "it was for the court to determine as a matter of law
the jurisdictional question of whether the alleged conduct affected interstate commerce; it was






116. Compare infra text accompanying note 120 (providing example of category III
instruction) with supra text accompanying note 113 (providing example of category II instruc-
tion).
117. See infra text accompanying note 120 (providing example of category III instruction).
118. 355 F.2d 891 (7th Cir. 1966).
119. See United States v. Kramer, 355 F.2d 891, 899-900 (7th Cir. 1966) (analyzing
instructions). In Kramer, the court considered the sufficiency of an instruction that enumerated
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court outlined the testimony of the Government witness and instructed the
jury that if it believed the Government's evidence, then it "may find that the
government has established the requisite element of effect on interstate
commerce under the Hobbs Act."'20 On appeal, the defendant claimed that the
trial court's instruction did not adequately define interstate commerce for the
jury, but did not object to the instruction's division of responsibility between
the judge and jury.2 Thus, the instruction remains untested.
Instructions in the fourth category properly grant to thejury full responsi-
bility for determining whether the prosecution has satisfied the interstate
commerce element. Courts employing instructions in the fourth category
inform the jury that a conviction under the Hobbs Act requires that the defen-
dant's actions affect interstate commerce." The judge may define interstate
commerce, but may not comment on the evidence alleged." The jury must
therefore determine whether the facts are true and determine whether the facts
are sufficient to prove the requisite effect on interstate commerce.'2 4
certain facts and instructed the jury that it could find from those facts, if true, that interstate
commerce had been affected. Id. The defendant, a labor union organizer, had extorted money
from a sub-contractor. Id. at 894. The sub-contractor had been awarded a contract, but needed
union employees to work the job, or he would lose the contract. Id. The defendant, who was
in charge of dispatching workers to union jobs, demanded $1,000 for his services. Id. at 895.
Motivated by fear that he would lose his contract if he could not find workers, the sub-contrac-
tor agreed to pay the fee. Id. The defendant was later charged under the Hobbs Act. Id. at 896.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial judge's instruction impermissibly prejudiced his
defense. Id. at 900. The instruction read as follows:
If you believe the testimony of the government witnesses with reference to where
the various materials came from which were supplied to the Illinois Bell job and
with reference to the use to which the building upon which the work was to be
performed would be put, and if you find that the defendants' activities as shown by
the government's testimony did delay, obstruct and affect interstate commerce in
any way or degree - because that language is used in the statute - then you may
find that the government has established the requisite element of effect on interstate
commerce under the Hobbs Act.
Id at 899-900. The court upheld the instruction, although it noted with some disapproval that
the charge defined interstate commerce by implication rather than with specific reference to the
explicit definition Congress provided within the statute itself. See id. at 900 ("The charge
defines interstate commerce by implication. Although a more precise definition in the words
of the statute is to be preferred,. . . the charge in this case-was not so inadequate that the jury
could not determine the question fairly.")
120. Id. at 899-900.
121. Id. at 900.
122. See infra text accompanying note 128 (discussing example of category IV instruc-
tion).
123. See infra text accompanying note 128 (same).
124. See infra text accompanying note 128 (same).
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In United States v. Jarrett,"5 the Seventh Circuit considered an instruc-
tion in the fourth category.126 A federal jury convicted Ronald Jarrett of
robbing an Illinois jewelry store of at least $2000 worth of merchandise in
violation of the Hobbs Act.2 7 The trial judge properly instructed the jury as
to the legal definition of affecting interstate commerce and further explained
that the jury would have to decide that Jarrett's robbery had affected interstate
commerce before it could convict Jarrett.' On appeal, however, Jarrett
complained that the jury's role is merely to make raw findings of fact and that
the trial judge's instruction "improperly delegated to the jury" the interstate
commerce element.'29 Remarking that Jarrett had failed to object to the
instruction at trial, the Seventh Circuit rejected the appeal. 3 '
II. Federalization of Crime
A. Increasing Numbers
Traditionally, the federal government has played a limited role in crimi-
nal law enforcement.' Enforcement historically has been a matter primarily
local in nature, an understanding dating back to the original colonists.3 2
Indeed, the concept of limited federal involvement, and its political directives,
dominated policy throughout the first century of this country's history.'
125. 705 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1983).
126. See United States v. Jarrett, 705 F.2d 198, 203-04 (7th Cir. 1983) (providing jury
instruction and analysis); cf United States v. Battaglia, 394 F.2d 304, 312 (7th Cir. 1968)
(considering category IV jury charge objected to on other grounds). In Jarrett, the court
considered ajury instruction that broadly defined interstate commerce and then left to the jury
both the purely factual questions and the issues requiring application of those facts to the legal
standard. Jarrett, 705 F.2d at 203-04. The defendant claimed, somewhat antithetically, that the
trial court erred in instructing the jury that it may apply the facts to the law. Id at 203.
Although it noted the existence of precedence for the proposition that the court may determine
jurisdictional elements, the court rejected the defendant's appeal. Id. at 204.
127. Jarrett, 705 F.2d at 201.
128. Id. at 203.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 204.
131. See Senator Joseph. R. Biden, Jr., Setting the Stage for the Nineties - Our Mutual
Obligation, Address to Judicial Conference to the Third Circuit, in 140 CONG. REC. S6100
(daily ed. May 19, 1994) (statement of Sen. Biden) (outlining federal government's historical
role in criminal law); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (noting that
states historically are sovereign in areas of criminal law enforcement and education).
132. See Gerald G. Ashdown, Federalism, Federalization, and the Politics of Crime, 98
W. VA. L. REV. 789, 789-90 (1996) (discussing history of criminal law).
133. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief The Federalization of American Crim-
inal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1138 (1995) (discussing history of criminal law). Brickey
suggests that the founding fathers never envisioned a national police power. Id. The limited
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Early political thinkers argued for a limited federal presence, largely because
they believed that crime's impact was generally limited to the immediate
geographic locale."" The expected benefits of criminal punishment were
thought to be similarly limited, adding further justification for restricting the
federal authority's control.'35
The firsf federal crime bill'36 was a modest one.'37 The statute estab-
lished federal prohibitions against a small set of activities that affected purely
federal interests.' It reached crimes related to the federal judicial process,1
39
violence against foreign diplomats, 4 piracy within the jurisdiction of the
United States,'4 ' counterfeiting of United States certificates or securities,'42
and treason against the United States.43 The bill also reached crimes arguably
not exclusively related to purely federal interests - murder, manslaughter,
mayhem, and larceny - but restricted its scope to reach such crimes only when
criminal jurisdiction that Congress reluctantly invoked was concurrent with state jurisdiction.
Id. Congress often included provisions within criminal statutes that granted to states not merely
concurrentjurisdiction, but also primaryjurisdiction over federally defined crimes. See Charles
Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 HARv. L. RF-v. 545, 548-54 (1925)
(discussing history of criminal law); see also Biden, supra note 131 (discussing history of fed-
eral criminal jurisdiction).
134. See Ashdown, supra note 132, at 789-90 (discussing impact of crime); see also
Brickey, supra note 133, at 1138 (same). The content of local criminal laws in early America
was and continues to be an "expression of local mores and concerns." See id. at 1138-39
(discussing history of criminal law); see also Ashdown, supra note 132, at 789 (same).
135. See Ashdown, supra note 132, at789-90 (analyzing origins oflimited federal criminal
jurisdiction).
136. Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 (1790) (repealed).
137. See Ashdown, supra note 132, at 790 & n.5 (analyzing Crimes Act).
138. See Biden, supra note 131 ("Early on, the Congress prohibited and punished only
those acts directly related to the functions of the Federal Government or occurring on United
States Territory - acts which could not be covered by the criminal laws of the States."); see also
Ashdown, supra note 132, at 790 & n.5 (discussing early federal criminal litigation); Brickey,
supra note 133, at 1138 (same).
139. Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, §§ 15, 18,21-23, 1 Stat. at 115-17; see Biden, supra note
131 (describing Crimes Act's reach); David P. Currie, The Constitution In Congress: Substan-
tive Issues In The First Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. CHi. L. REV. 775, 833 & n.342 (1994)
(same).
140. Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, § 28, 1 Stat. at 118; see Biden, supra note 131 (describing
Crimes Act's reach); Currie, supra note 139, at 832-33 & n.341 (same).
141. Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, §§ 8-13, 1 Stat. at 113-15; see Biden, supra note 131
(describing Crimes Act's reach); Currie, supra note 139, at 831 & n.332 (same).
142. Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, § 14, 1 Stat. at 115; see Biden, supra note 131 (describing
Crimes Act's reach); Currie, supra note 139, at 832 & n.336 (same).
143. Crimes Act of 1790, cl. 9, §§ 1-2, 1 Stat. at 112; see Biden, supra note 131 (describ-
ing Crimes Act's reach); Currie, supra note 139, at 829 & n.320 (same).
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they took place in a geographic area exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
federal government.1" Later federal enactments increased the scope of federal
criminal prohibitions, but the reach of those statutes remained severely
limited. 4
During the Civil War era, the federal criminal code remained, a thin
collection of cautious statutory provisions of limited scope. 46 In 1890,
however, Congress reversed its traditional policy of limited federal intrusion
into criminal law by passing the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 147 Passage of the
Sherman Act gave credence to a new theory: that states required federal
assistance in some areas of criminal law enforcement and that the need
justified the federal government's expansion.148  After the Sherman Act,
federal criminal statutes expanded rapidly in number and scope. 49 Today,
there are more than three thousand federal criminal provisions. 5°
144. Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, §§ 3,7, 13, 16, 17, 1 Stat. at 113, 115-16; see Biden, supra
note 131 (describing Crimes Act's reach); Currie, supra note 139, at 830 & n.342 (same).
145. See Brickey, supra note 133, at 1139 (discussing history of federalism of crime
phenomenon); see also Biden, supra note 131 (same).
146. See Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the
Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 981 & n.1 1 (1995)
(acknowledging that only small number of federal offenses existed prior to Civil War). Beale
recognizes that Pre-Civil War federal statutes principally focused on: "(1) acts threatening the
existence of the federal government (e.g., treason); (2) misconduct of federal officers (e.g.,
bribery); (3) interference with the operation of the federal courts (e.g., perjury); and
(4) interference with other governmental programs (e.g., theft of government property and rev-
enue fraud)." Id. The specific offenses did not overlap with offenses subject to state prosecu-
tion. Id.
147. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994)). Congress targeted monopolies, the "'commercial monsters' that required
the 'iron hand of the [federal] law' to be 'heavily' laid on in order to protect the 'boasted lib-
erty of the citizen."' Ashdown, supra note 132, at 791 & n.9 (quoting 20 CONG. REC. 1457
(1889)). But see Biden, supra note 131 (discussing motivation for federalizing crime). Sen.
Biden stated: "The driving force behind the expansion of Federal jurisdiction was the percep-
tion of the Congress that State courts were not able or, in some cases, not willing to protect
Federal rights - in that instance, the civil rights - of the recently freed African-American
slaves." Id.
148. See Ashdown, supra note 132, at790 & n.5 (discussing motivation behind Sherman
Anti-Trust Act (quoting 20 CONG. REc. 1457 (1889)).
149. See Ashdown, supra note 132, at791 (discussing history of criminal law). Ashdown
writes of the Sherman Act's passage: "The tiger was loose." 1d.
150. Roger J. Miner, Crime andPunishment in the Federal Courts, 43 SYRACUsEL. REV.
681, 681 (1992). Though Judge Miner published his figure in 1992, later authors have noted
that Congress has enacted many new offenses since Miner's article. See Beale, supra note 146,
at 980 & n.10 (1995) (providing analysis of federalization of crime phenomenon); Sam J. Ervin,
III, The Federalization ofState Crimes: Some Observations andReflections, 98 W. VA. L. REv.
761, 762 & n.3 (1996) (supporting 3000 as estimate of federal criminal provisions).
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Federal criminal statutes have proliferated, especially in recent dec-
ades.' Public demand for increased protection from criminal activity has
fueled much of the growth.'52 Legislating crime at the federal level has
become a highly politicized issue.' Voter concern provides Washington
lawmakers with incentive to beat their drums and promise that Congress will
accelerate the legislative assault on crime.'54 The 1994 and 1996 congres-
151. See Beale, supra note 146, at 979 (discussing history of federal criminaljurisdiction);
see also Sara Sun Beale, Reporter's Draft for the Working Group on Principles to Use When
Considering the Federalization of Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1277, 1278-82 (1995)
(tracing historical evolution and expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction and linking prolifera-
tion of federal police powers to post-Civil War growth in interstate commerce that created
national problems and demanded national solutions). The advent of the omnibus crime bill
concept increased the pace of crime's federalization. See Brickey, supra note 133, at 1144
(discussing history of criminal law). Brickey notes that the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of42 U.S.C.), in final form, targeted "community policing, prisons, crime preven-
tion, drug courts, violence against women, the death penalty, mandatory minimum sentences,
firearms, criminal aliens, rural crime, and marketing scams directed at senior citizens." Brickey,
supra note 133, at 1144 & n.60. Congress has enacted several other omnibus bills including
the Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789; the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207; the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976; the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236; the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922; and the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub.
L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197.
152. See Americans are Optimistic for Themselves, Not the Nation; Survey Finds Many
Lament Social and MoralDecline, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 17, 1997, at 5A (citing Pew Research
Center survey finding that 61% of Americans think crime is increasing in severity); Abortion
Report, American Political Network, Feb. 3, 1997, available in Westlaw Library, APN-AB file
(citing Harris poll finding that crime and violence is top issue Americans would like government
to address).
153. See Ashdown, supra note 132, at 794 (discussing federalization of crime phenomenon
and motivations behind trend). Ashdown notes that the modem media also fuels the federaliza-
tion process and creates a self-propelling fear of crime. Idl
154. See J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, The Drawbacks of Growth in the Federal Judiciary, 43
EMORY L.J. 1147, 1151-52 (1994) (discussing motivation of Congress in federalizing crime).
Wilkinson suggests that Congressmen may vote for or sponsor a new federal criminal law as a
signal to local voters that their Congressman is looking out for their interests. Id.; see also
Aaron Epstein, Using U.S. Laws Is Just Tough Talk, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jan. 29, 1994, at Al
(reporting on trend, at least since early 1980s, of Presidents and members of Congress to call
for increased federal role in crime prevention). Epstein writes of Congress: "Like politicians
everywhere, they don't want to be labeled soft on crime." Id. In his first State of the Union
Address since beginning his second term as President, Bill Clinton called for:
[A] full-scale assault on juvenile crime, with [federal] legislation that declares war
on gangs, with new prosecutors and tougher penalties; extends the Brady bill so
violent teen criminals will not be able to buy handguns; requires child-safety locks
on handguns to prevent unauthorized use; and helps to keep our schools open after
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sional elections provide compelling examples. 55 In 1994, Republicans used
their "Contract with America" (Contract) promises to take control of both
houses of Congress.56 In relevant part, the Contract promised a vote on a fed-
eral "anti-crime package thatwould include limits on death penalty appeals and
more money for prisons and law enforcement" within the first one-hundred
days after Republicans took office.'57 Electors gladly offered their supporting
votes. ' By the 1996 election, however, Democrats had turned the issue
around." 9 Looking for a symbol of Republican weakness on crime, they high-
lighted the GOP's efforts to block Clinton-sponsored crime legislation"6 and
subsequently recaptured some ofthe ground lost in 1994.2 Today's political
environment requires candidates to establish strong anticrime images. 62 The
candidate who fails to project the image, fails equally at the polls.
63
hours, on weekends, and in the summer, so our young people will have someplace
to go and something to say yes to.
William J. Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,
33 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 136, 141 (Feb. 10, 1997) (President William J. Clinton). The
President also called for passage ofavictim's rights amendment and "the largest anti-drug effort
ever." Id.
155. See Ashdown, supra note 132, at 794 (calling it "virtually inconceivable today to
imagine a political position that did not include a 'get tough on crime' stance").
156. See Rich Smith & Kriste Goad, Sundquist's Grass-roots Win: Bredesen Promises
Cooperation, NASHvILLE BANNER, Nov. 9, 1994, at All (reporting Republicans' gaining
control ofboth houses of Congress); see also The Power Shift, SAN JOSEMERCURYNEWs, Nov.
10, 1994, atAl (same).
157. See David Espo, Election '94: GOP Plans Quick Action on Issues in Contract,
COUIUER-J. (Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 10, 1994, at 4A (reprinting Republican Contract with
America).
158. See Smith & Goad, supra note 156, at All (reporting grassroots-level Republican
sweep in major Tennessee elections and Republican victories in other major elections nation-
wide); see also The Power Shift, supra note 156, at Al (reporting widespread Republican
victories).
159. See Graeme Zielinski, Will Democrats Hit GOP on Crime Votes: Fiery Rhetoric
Defends Clinton, CHI.TRiB., July 1, 1996, at 1 (discussing Democrats' strategy on crime issues).
Democrats used the "Contract's" failures as a symbol of Republican weakness on crime. Id.
160. See id. (discussing Democrats' strategy on crime issues). Democratic candidate for
Congress Clem Balanoff said Republican efforts to undermine congressional crime legislation
made it easier for "maniacs, cop-killers and terrorists." Id. Another Democratic candidate,
Susan Hynes, described Republican crime efforts as "unconscionable." See id. ("Every member
of the 103rd and 104th Congress who voted against the crime bill or tried to gut it will have to
answer in November.").
161. See Phillip Trounstine, SANJOSEMERcURYNEWs, Nov. 6, 1996, at 2EL (discussing
Democrats' 1996 victories).
162. See Ashdown, supra note 132, at 794 (discussing virtually required tough-on-crime
message).
163. See id. (discussing virtually required tough-on-crime message).
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Congressional chest-thumping is effective, but the effect produced is not
what the public intended."6 New federal criminal statutes rarely add to the
overall sum of criminal prohibitions; they tend merely to target activitythat
state law already prohibits. 65 In so doing, the new provisions have the sole
effect of extending the federal government's jurisdiction to cover crimes
federal prosecutors previously could not target." This effect has prompted
calls of concern from alarmed constitutional scholars. 67 This Note's next
subpart considers an important question fundamental to the continued federal-
ization of crime: whether Congress has the constitutional authority to target
criminal activity on such a grand scale.'68
B. Constitutional Constraints
Ours is a federal government of constitutionally enumerated powers, 6 9
164. See Trust in Government Survey, Princeton Survey Research Associates, Jan. 1, 1996,
available in Westlaw Library, POLL file (finding that crime is many Americans' top priority,
but also finding that most believe congressional efforts to curb crime have either had no effect
or have worsened problem). The telephone opinion poll found that nearly 60% of Americans
think crime should be the top priority for Congress. See id. However, the same poll found that
nearly 90% of Americans believe Washington's efforts have "made things worse" or "not-had
much effect either way." Id. The results do not vary significantly within any particular sub-
population. See id. (providing results by subgroup). Several other surveys have found similar
results. See, e.g., CBS News Poll, CBS News, Feb. 4, 1997, available in Westlaw Library,
POLL file (finding crime as public's major priority); Harris Poll, Louis Harris and Associates,
Feb. 3, 1997, available in Westlaw Library, POLL file (same); Gallup/C.N.N...S.A. Today
Poll, Gallup Organization, Jan. 1, 1997, available in Westlaw Library, POLL file (same); ABC
News Poll, ABC News, Jan. 20, 1997, available in Westlaw Library, POLL file (same); CBS
News/New York Times Poll, CBS News/New York Times, Jan. 19, 1997, available in Westlaw
Library, POLL file (same) People & the Press Pre-Election Survey, Princeton Survey Research
Associates, Oct. 4, 1996, available in Westlaw Library, POLL file (finding most Americans
believe crime will get worse or not change even after Congress acts).
165. See Beale, supra note 151, at 1282 (discussing federalization of crime); see also
Ervin, supra note 149, at 762 (discussing concurrent jurisdiction).
166. See Beale, supra note 151, at 1282 (discussing effect of new federal laws). Examples
of federal statutes that extend criminal jurisdiction over activities already prohibited by states
include, but are not limited to, statutes prohibiting engaging in prostitution, dealing in stolen
motor vehicles, selling liquor, running lotteries, selling or possessing narcotics, kidnapping,
fleeing interstate, transporting stolen property, and committing robbery and extortion. See
Ashdown, supra note. 132, at 791-92 (listing statutes establishing concurrent jurisdiction).
167. Beale, supra note 151, at 1282 (noting concern over Constitution's limits).
168. See infra Part III.B (analyzing problems).
169. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (describing constitutional
system of government); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405-07 (1819)
(recognizing that parties will forever question extent of powers granted). The enumerated
powers are provided in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8; see
JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD ROTUNDA, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 3.1 (5th ed. 1995) (describing
system of government as one of enumerated powers).
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granted to the central authority by the citizenry.170 Those powers that the
people do not place within the jurisdiction of the federal government, the Con-
stitution reserves for the states.1 71 These maxims are universally avowed."7
The constitutional structure creates a system that is necessarily one of
dual sovereignty; the Constitution's implied principle of federalism polices
the balance between the two sovereigns based on subject matter.' 7' The
concept of federalism is controversial and often misunderstood. 74 At its core,
however, federalism is a seductively simple expression of the distribution of
legislative jurisdiction in the United States: What the Constitution delegates
to the federal government to do, it may do. 75 What the Constitution fails to
170. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 403-07 ("The government proceeds directly
from the people."); William G. Bassler, The Federalization ofDomestic Violence: An Exercise
in Cooperative Federalism or a Misallocation ofFederal Judicial Resources?, 48 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1139, 1173 (1996) (discussing concept of American government).
171. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 169, § 3.1 & n. 10 (discussing federalism); see
also U.S. CONST. amend. X (providing exact constitutional text). The Tenth Amendment has
a checkered jurisprudential past that is beyond the scope of this Note. See NOWAK& ROTUNDA,
supra note 169, § 3.1 (discussing TenthAmendmentjurisprudence). Most recently, courts have
adopted the interpretationthattheAmendment is amere "truism" that dictates that Congress may
not act without constitutional authority. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941).
172. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405 ("The government is acknowledged by all
to be one of enumerated powers."); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155
(1992) (stating that "no one disputes the proposition"). Equally universal, given the current
state of constitutional jurisprudence, is the common refrain that Congress's power is broad
enough to sweep almost any action within its jurisdiction. See Lawrence Lessig, Translating
Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 Sup. CT. Rev. 125,127 (1995) (analyzing expansion
of Commerce Clause authority).
173. See Bassler, supra note 170, at 1173-74 (discussing federalism in context of dual
sovereignty).
174. See id at 1174 (acknowledging that "aprecise definition offederalism has never been
clear"). The theory and practice of federalism has been the subject of controversy since the
beginning of the republic. Id. Bassler claims that federalism is by its very nature paradoxical.
Id. Alexis de Tocqueville also considered the confusion in his writings on American govern-
ment. See 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVmhLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 167 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
Henry Reeve trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1994) (1848) (discussing American government).
De Tocqueville wrote:
I scarcely ever met with a plain American citizen who could not distinguish with
surprising facility the obligations created by the laws of Congress from those
created by the laws of his own state, and who, after having discriminated between
the matters which come under the cognizance of the Union and those which the
local legislature is competent to regulate, could not point out the exact limit of the
separate jurisdictions of the Federal courts and the tribunals of the state.
Id Justice Kennedy has suggested that federalism confuses because "federalism was the unique
contribution of the Framers to political science and political theory." See United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (discussing origins of federalism).
175. William Van Alstyne, Federalism, Congress, The States and the Tenth Amendment:
Adrift in the Cellophane Sea, 1987 DUKE L.J. 769, 770.
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delegate to the federal authority is reserved for the states. 76 In a political
environment that increasingly urges lawmakers to federalize crime,'" federal-
ism poses a challenging question: 17 Does the Constitution allow Congress to
claim jurisdiction over the general subject matter of crime?
179
The plain answer to the question is no: Congress does not enjoy a
plenary police power to prohibit crime as crime.8 ° Authority to regulate
crime does not appear in Congress's list of enumerated powers.'' The
Constitution reserves police powers for the states.' Although Congress does
not have authority to legislate against crime per se, it may assert jurisdiction
over subject matters specifically enumerated in the Constitution and then
expand that jurisdictional base to cover criminal matters pertaining to the
enumerated power.' In a sense, then, the practical answer to the question is
176. Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison) (stating that "the powers
delegated by the ... Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which
are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite."); 3 J. STORY, COMMEN-
TARIES ONTHE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 752 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1833)
("Being an instrument of limited and enumerated powers, it follows irresistibly, that what is not
conferred, is withheld, and belongs to the state authorities.").
177. See supra Part III.A (discussing federalization of crime phenomenon).
178. See infra notes 185-201 and accompanying text (discussing Commerce Clause
jurisprudence as confused).
179. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 & n.3 (1995) (discussing limited
powers of federal government in context of crime).
180. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109 (1945) (plurality opinion) (discussing
federalism structure).
181. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8 (providing list of enumerated powers).
182. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456
U.S. 107,128 (1982)) ("States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal
law."); see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,759 n.4 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(finding that crime is primarily matter of state concern). Justice Marshall wrote:
Preventing danger to the community through the enactment and enforcement
of criminal laws is indeed a legitimate goal, but in our system the achievement of
that goal is left primarily to the States. The Constitution does not contain an explicit
delegation to the Federal Government of the power to define and administer the
general criminal law.
Id. The Constitution, however, is not the affirmative source of state police power. Van Alstyne,
supra note 175, at 770 & n.5. The constitutions of individual states grant police power to each
State. Id.
183. See Screws, 325 U.S. at 109 (plurality opinion) (discussing phenomenon as matter of
empirical fact). The Screws plurality wrote: "Our national government is one of delegated
powers alone. Under our federal system the administration of criminal justice rests with the
States except as Congress, acting within the scope of those delegated powers, has created
offenses against the United States." Id. The Court recognized Congress's power to legislate
outside of its explicitly enumerated power in United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co. See
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942) (analyzing scope of federal
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yes: Congress does have jurisdiction over criminal activity to the extent that
the criminal activity affects an enumerated power.'1
The broadest grant of constitutional authority to Congress is the Com-
merce Clause.185 The Clause explicitly grants Congress power to regulate
foreign commerce, interstate commerce, and commerce with Indian Tribes.8 6
Despite the Clause's broad reach, however, courts have consistently insisted
that Congress's jurisdiction is limited.'87 In United States v. Lopez,' the
Supreme Court reaffirmed that suggestion and struck down a federal criminal
law as beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause.8 9 The issue in
Lopez was whether a federal statute prohibiting possession of a handgun in a
school zone was constitutional.' The appellant was Alfonso Lopez, a
jurisdiction). The Wrightwood Dairy Court noted that federal jurisdiction extended to allow
Congress to regulate interstate commerce and also to reach "those intrastate activities which in
a substantial way interfere with or obstruct the exercise of the granted power." Id.
184. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552-62 (analyzing history of enumerated power). Lopez
concluded that Congress's targeted subject matter did not affect an enumerated power in the
first place and, therefore, federal statutes could not reach it. Id at 567-68.
185. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) (discussing history of
Commerce Clause interpretation).
186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The text of the Clause provides that Congress has
authority "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes." Id TheNecessary and Proper Clause, id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 18, combines with
the Commerce Clause to expand the commerce power even further. See Legal Tender Cases,
110 U.S. 421,449-50 (1884) (discussing rational basis test); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316, 411-21 (1819) (same).
187. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (noting that clause's
scope "must be considered in the light of our dual system of government"). The Jones &
Laughlin Steel Court determined that the Commerce Clause "may not be extended so as to
embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view
of our complex society, would effectively obliterate the distinction between what is national and
what is local and create a completely centralized government." Id.; see also Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 124-25 (1942) (noting that Congress's jurisdiction extends only to activity that
"exerts asubstantial economic effect on interstate commerce"); United States v. Darby, 3 12 U.S.
100, 119-20 (1941) (indicating that Congress's jurisdiction reaches only activity having
"substantial effect" on interstate commerce).
188. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
189. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (striking down Gun-Free
School Zones Act as unconstitutional). In Lopez, the Court considered whether the Gun-Free
School Zones Act is constitutional. Id. The plaintiff, a twelfth-grade high school student who
possessed a gun on school grounds was convicted under federal law and challenged the statute
on constitutional grounds. See id at 551-52 (discussing facts of case). After a careful assess-
ment ofthe Commerce Clause's historical interpretations, the Court determined thatthe gun law
was invalid as beyond the scope of Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause. See id.
at 552-68.
190. Id. at 552.
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twelfth-grade student who had been convicted of violating the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 199091 by carrying onto school property a concealed .38
caliber handgun and five cartridges. 92 Lopez argued that Congress did not
.have jurisdiction to reach his firearm possession. 93 The Court determined
that the statute was constitutional only if the conduct underlying the statute fit
into one of three categories:
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate com-
merce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in inter-
state commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate
activities. Finally, Congress'[s] commerce authority includes the power
to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate com-
merce.
194
The Gun-Free School Zone Act clearly did not seek to regulate the channels
of commerce or its instrumentalities, so the Court focused its discussion on
whether the firearm possession statute regulated activity that substantially
affected interstate commerce. 95 The Court found that the statute related
neither to commerce nor to any sort of economic enterprise.' 96 Thus, the
statute could not stand.
19 7
Lopez immediately threw long-established Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence into disarray. 98 The Court admits as much itself.'99 Although Lopez
191. Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994).
192. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
193. Id. at 552.
194. Id. at 558-59 (internal citations removed).
195. See id. at 559 (analyzing statute).
196. Id. at 559-61.
197. Id. at 561.
198. See infra note 205 and accompanying text (describing interpretation ofLopez in lower
courts). At least twenty-five sections of the criminal code define their scope using the term
"affecting commerce." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 630 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (providing figures).
Justice Breyer, in dissent, voiced concern over whether Lopez alters the meaning of the
jurisdictional elements contained in those criminal sections. Id (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice
Breyer further noted the effect that the Lopez decision had on the state of the law:
More importantly, in the absence of ajurisdictional element, are the courts never-
theless to take Wickard, 317 U.S., at 127-128, (and later similar cases) as inapplica-
ble, and to judge the effect of a single noncommercial activity on interstate com-
merce without considering similar instances of the forbidden conduct? However
these questions are eventually resolved, the legal uncertainty now created will
restrict Congress'[s] ability to enact criminal laws aimed at criminal behavior that,
considered problem by problem rather than instance by instance, seriously threatens
the economic, as well as social, well-being of Americans.
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does not explicitly overrule any prior opinions, the result achieved in Lopez,
striking down a federal statute on jurisdictional grounds, altered the de facto
interpretation of the Commerce Clause - that the Clause was virtually limit-
less.2" The majority's response: Constitutional law is confusing by nature.0 1
C. Incentive for a Jurisdictional Element
Lopez's immediate effect was to thrust Commerce Clause jurisprudence
into disarray, but over the long-term, Lopez provides Congress with a formula
for future stability.2' The decision offers a means whereby Congress can
ensure that future statutes do not suffer the same fate that the Gun-Free School
Zones Act faced.2 3 In Lopez, the Court acknowledged that the firearm
possession law did not contain ajurisdictional element, that is, an element that
would ensure that in every future prosecution, the Government would have to
prove that the defendant's illegal activity affected interstate commerce.2
°4
Subsequently, courts have interpreted Lopez as providing a second holding:
Statutes containing an interstate commerce element are definitively within
Congress's interstate commerce jurisdiction and, therefore, are not subject to
claims that they are unconstitutionally broad.2"5 The assertion makes logical
Id at 530-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
199. d at 556 ("Admittedly, a determination whether an intrastate activity is commercial
or noncommercial may in some cases result in legal uncertainty.").
200. See id (analyzing effect of upholding statute). The majority contends that prior cases
have "taken long steps down [the] road, giving great deference to congressional action," such
that these prior cases nearly converted "congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to
a general police power of the sort retained by the States." Id. at 567. Although the de facto
precedent from the broad language of the Court's prior opinions "has suggested the possibility
of additional expansion," the Court refused to proceed any further. Id at 567.
201. See id at 566-67 (finding that "[t]he Constitution mandates this uncertainty by
withholding from Congress aplenary policepowerthatwould authorize enactment ofeverytype
of legislation").
202. See infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text (indicating that Lopez may provide
Congress with simple means to ensure its statutes are not unconstitutionally broad).
203. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62 (alternative holding) (finding that Gun-Free School
Zones Act did not contain jurisdictional element).
204. Id. at 561 (stating that gun statute "contains no jurisdictional element which would
ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate
commerce"). The Court determined that the jurisdictional element would have limited the
statute's reach "to a discrete set of firearm possessions that [would] additionally have an explicit
connection with or effect on interstate commerce." Id at 562.
205. See supra note 30 (defining jurisdictional element and its effect). The Lopez Court
held that the gun law was unconstitutionally broad. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. The Court stated
that a jurisdictional element would necessarily have confined the statute to its jurisdictional
limits, id. at 562; therefore, later courts have asserted that the inclusion of the jurisdictional
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sense.2 °6 If Congress were to enact two laws, one prohibiting a specified
activity whenever it occurs and another prohibiting the same activity only
when it affects interstate commerce, then the second prohibition would, by
definition, be within Congress's jurisdiction, whereas the first would not
necessarily be legitimate because the government could potentially use it to
prosecute someone whose activity did not affect interstate commerce.2"7
Whether or not the Court intended that reading of the Lopez opinion, Congress
has understood the Court to have sent a message that future criminal statutes
should include a jurisdictional element.08
If Lopez is indeed read to provide incentive for Congress to include
jurisdictional elements in criminal statutes, then the jury instruction is all the
more critical.20 9 The instruction on the interstate commerce element deter-
mines whether the judge or the jury ultimately decides whether the element
is satisfied."' If Congress's incentive is to include the element more fre-
quently,211 and if the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that the jury must
ultimately decide whether the issue is satisfied,21 2 then Lopez provides incen-
element necessarily renders a federal statute constitutional as within the power of Congress. See
United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564, 568 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding inclusion ofjurisdictional
element distinguishes Lopez and renders statute constitutional under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(I)
(firearm possession)), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2470 (1997); see also United States v. DiSanto,
86 F.3d 1238, 1245 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding inclusion ofjurisdictional element distinguishes
Lopez and renders statute constitutional under 18 U.S.C. 844(i) (arson)), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 1109 (1997); United States v. Turner, 77 F.3d 887, 889 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding inclusion
ofjurisdictional element distinguishes Lopez and renders statute constitutional under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (firearm possession)); United States v. Diaz-Martinez, 71 F.3d 946, 953 (1st Cir.
1995) (finding inclusion of jurisdictional 'element distinguishes Lopez and renders statute
constitutional under 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (firearm possession)).
206. See supra note 205 (discussing logic of alternative holding); see also supra note 30
(describing effect ofjurisdictional element).
207. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62 (discussing same effect under firearm possession
statute); see also note 30 (defining jurisdictional element). ,
208. See Kathleen Brickey, Crime Control and the Commerce Clause: Life After Lopez,
46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 801, 839 (1996) (suggesting that Congress should "view Lopez as a
warning shot across the bow"). Brickey wonders, in light of Lopez, whether Congress will
become much more cautious in deciding whether to federalize a particular crime in the future
or will simply include ajurisdictional element. Id. She answers her own question: "Congress
is an institution that is all too eager to look tough on crime, so the politics of crime control make
it highly unlikely that Congress will become a model of restraint." Id.
209. See supra notes 89-91, infra notes 233-38, and accompanying text (noting that
instructions define respective roles ofjudge and jury).
210. See supra notes 89-91, infra notes 233-38, and accompanying text (describing
jurisdictional elements).
211. See supra Part III.C (discussing incentive for Congress to include jurisdictional
element in federal criminal statutes).
212. See infra Part IV (discussing Fifth and Sixth Amendment guarantees to jury trial).
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tive for Congress to push down crucial questions of jurisdiction - questions
of constitutional magnitude - to the trial level and mandates that the jury
answer them on a case-by-case basis." 3 The incredible constitutional effect
of that incentive is to force judges to decide either to allow juries to interpret
the constitution from inside the jury box or to strip defendants of their consti-
tutional right to a jury trial.
IV. The Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights to Jury Trial
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution ensures that no
person shall be deprived of his liberties without due process of law."4 The
due process requirement, within the context of a criminal trial, requires the
prosecution to prove every element of the offense charged.2"' The amendment
grants the criminal defendant a fundamental right21 6 to an acquittal, unless the
proper factfinder finds that the prosecution carried its burden of proving every
element beyond a reasonable doubt.217
213. See infra note 216-17 and accompanying text (discussing jury's role in determining
truth of every element charged).
214. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. The relevant text of the amendment reads: "No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." See also United States v.
Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509-10 (1995) (discussing Fifth Amendment's mandate).
215. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,277-78 (1993) (concluding that prosecution
has constitutional duty to prove every element of crime beyond reasonable doubt); see also
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210-11 (1977) (declining to extend Fifth Amendment
guarantees to require proof of nonexistence of affirmative defenses); Leland v. Oregon, 343
U.S. 790, 795 (1952) (noting that burden rests with prosecution throughout entire trial).
216. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (analyzing due
process requirement in criminal trial context). Justice Harlan noted that the use of the "beyond
a reasonable doubt' standard is as much a result of policy concern as it is of constitutional
delineation. Id at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring). Harlan pointed to the fact that the trial system
sometimes results in erroneous convictions of innocent defendants and acquittals ofguilty ones.
Id at 370-71 (Harlan, J., concurring). Applying the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard to
every element of the crime charged reflects the value judgment society makes after assessing
"the comparative social disutility of each" erroneous outcome. Id. at 371 (Harlan, I., concur-
ring). In a criminal case, "we do not view the social disutility of convicting an innocent man
as equivalent to the disutility of acquitting someone who is guilty... it is far worse to convict
an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." Id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring).
217. Id. at 361-64 (holding "explicitly... that the Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged"). That the Due Process Clause requires the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard is not a new proposition; the Supreme Court has long
determined that the standard is constitutionally required. Id. at 362. See, e.g., Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958) (requiring "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard);
Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 138 (1954) (same); Leland, 343 U.S. at 795 (same);
Brinegarv. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949) (same); Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S.
563, 569-70 (1914) (same); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910) (same); Davis v.
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In Sullivan v. Louisiana,"'8 the Supreme Court found that the Fifth Amend-
ment's due process guarantee is necessarily interrelated with the trial guaran-
tees of the Constitution and the Sixth Amendment.219 The Constitution
mandates that criminal trials be trials byjury. The Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution also guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury."'' Read
together, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments provide criminal defendants with
the right to an acquittal, unless the jury finds that the prosecution carried its
burden of proving every element beyond a reasonable doubt.'m
In United States v. Gaudin, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed
the proposition that the constitutional protections of due process and jury trial
extend to every element of the crime charged.' In Gaudin, the petitioner,
Michael Gaudin, had been convicted of making material false statements in
United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895) (same); Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312
(1881) (same).
218. 508 U.S. 275 (1993).
219. See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 278 (analyzing Fifth and Sixth Amendments' relationship).
In Sullivan, the petitioner appealed his first-degree felony murder conviction on the theory that
the trial judge improperly instructed the jury on the reasonable doubt standard, depriving him
of the standard's protections. Id. at 277. The Supreme Court of Louisiana found the instruction
erroneous, but also found the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The Sullivan Court
found violations of the interrelated Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process and the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial whenever thejury merely returns a verdict ofprobably guilty and
leaves the judge to determine whether the defendant is ultimately guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 278. The Sullivan Court acknowledged that some constitutional errors may be
harmless "if the State could show 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did
not contribute to the verdict obtained."' 1d. at 279 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18,24(1967)). The proper test is normally "whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this
trial was surely unattributable to the error," but the Court found that the test is not applicable
when ajury does not return a verdict based on the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard in the
first place. Id. at 279-80. Thus, the "question whether the same verdict of guilty-beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt would have been rendered absent the constitutional error is utterly meaning-
less." Id. at 280.
220. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. The relevant text reads: "The trial of all Crimes,
except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury." Id.
221. U.S. CONST. amend VI. The Sixth Amendment was not necessary to require jury
trials in criminal cases. See United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 126 (1936). The rightto jury
trial is one of the few individual rights enumerated in the Constitution. See Albert W. Alschuler
& Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L.
REv. 867,871 (1994) (discussing right tojury trial). The right tojury trial is-the only guarantee
appearing in both the Constitution's text and the Bill of Rights. Id.
222. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510 (1995) (discussing right to jury trial);
Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 277-78 (same).
223. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 511 (analyzing Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to jury
trial).
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a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency. 4 Gaudin argued that his
conviction was unconstitutional because the trial judge had erred in removing
from the jury the element of materiality.'
Gaudin was an entrepreneur dealing in real estate during the 1980s.6
He purchased rental housing, renovated it, and sold it to friends and rela-
tives." Gaudin arranged for loans ensured by the Federal Housing Adminis-
tration, a federal agency."8 The purchaser, after acquiring the loan, then
resold the property to Gaudin at a small profit. 9 Gaudin assumed the loan,
but defaulted on his obligations." Gaudin allegedly violated the criminal
statute by making misrepresentations on the loan applications." Although
the parties stipulated that materiality is an element of the crime charged,," the
trial court instructed the jury that satisfaction of the element was a matter of
law for the court to decide. 3 On the basis of the judge's instructions, the jury
found Gaudin guilty? 4 In its analysis of Gaudin's appeal,' 5 the Supreme
224. See id, at 507; 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994) (providing text of statute at issue in Gaudin).
The relevant text of the statute is as follows:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent
statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry,
shall be fined not more then $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
225. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 507.
226. See id. at 507-08.
227. Id. The majority opinion called the purchasers "strawbuyers." Id. at 508.
228. Id
229. Id
230. Id Gaudin actually defaulted on 29 of the mortgage loans. Id
231. Id. The federal grandjury indicted Gaudin under § 1001 for "knowingly inflating the
appraised value of the mortgaged.property." Id. The indictment further alleged that Gaudin
wrote on his applications that the strawbuyer was to pay some closing costs, but, in reality,
Gaudin paid them all. Id,
232. Id. at 509.
233. Id at 508. Thejudge instructed the jury as follows: "The issue of materiality... is
not submitted to you for your decision but rather is a matter for the decision of the court. You
are instructed that the statements charged in the indictment are material statements." Id
234. Id, at 509.
235. See id at 511-22 (discussing appeal). The Government raised three arguments. Id
at 511. First, the Government argued that materiality is a legal question and that although
several previous Court opinions had held all elements must be charged to the jury, legal
questions were excepted. Id. The Government suggested that the Court split the elements into
their legal and factual components and charge thejury only on the latter. Id at 511-12. Second,
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Court presented the following compact syllogism as a restatement of the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments' mandate: 6
The Constitution gives a criminal defendant the right to demand that ajury
find him guilty of all the elements of the crime with which he is charged;
one of the elements in the present case is materiality; respondent therefore
had a right to have the jury decide materiality. 7
The Court determined that the trial judge's instructions removed materiality
fromjury determination and violated Gaudin's rights under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments." 8
Gaudin's legacy will likely be its expansive view of the right to jury
trial. 9 Relying on the simple syllogism, the Court extended the right to jury
trial to encompass all elements of the crime under which the defendant is
charged, including elements involving mixed questions of fact and law."
Prior to Gaudin, courts were unsure whether to charge juries on mixed ques-
tions of fact and law;241 Gaudin decisively answers the question in the affirma-
tive.
242
the Government argued that history served as precedent for excepting materiality from the
general rule that all elements must be charged to the jury. Id. at 515. Third, the Government
argued that stare decisis required the Court to follow its previous cases holding that pertinency
was a question of law for the court. Id. at 519. In reverse order, the Court responded by
rejecting prior cases that supported a historical exception for materiality and classifying
materiality as a mixed question of fact and law that must be charged to the jury. Id. at 519-23.
236. See id. at 524 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (highlighting "certain syllogistic neatness"
of majority's opinion). The Court did not consider whether materiality was an element of the
offense. Id. Currently, the federal circuit courts are split on the matter. Compare United States
v. Corsino, 812 F.2d 26,30 (lst Cir. 1987) (describing materiality as element of§ 1001 offense)
with United States v. Elkin, 731 F.2d 1005, 1009 (2d Cir. 1984) (following circuit precedent
holding that materiality is not element of § 1001 offense). At trial, however, both the Govern-
ment and the defendant stipulated that materiality was an element. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509.
237. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 511 (emphasis added).
238. Id. at 522-23. Justice Scalia wrote the Court's unanimous opinion. See id. at 507.
Chief Justice Rehnquist,joined by Justices O'Conner and Breyer, filed the concurring opinion.
See id. at 523 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (providing concurrence).
239. See Old Chiefv. United States, 117 S. Ct. 644,659 (1997) (O'Conner, J., dissenting)
(finding that Gaudin's right to jury trial is so important that it prevents defendant even from
conceding elements).
240. See Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 512 (interpreting right to jury trial).
241. See supra Part II.B (describing differences between effects of various jury instruc-
tions).
242. See United States v. Uchimura, 125 F.3d 1282, 1284 (9th Cir. 1997) (interpreting
Gaudin to require courts to instructjury on mixed questions of fact and law for filing a false tax
return under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (1994)); see also United States v. DeFries, 129 F.3d 1293,
1311 n. 11 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (interpreting Gaudin to require courts to instruct jury on mixed
questions of fact and law for RICO claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1994)); United States v.
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V United States v. Parker
Jury instructions on the "affecting interstate commerce" element of
federal crimes often violate defendants' rights to jury trial.243 By effectively
removing the jurisdictional element of federal crimes from the jury, such
instructions allowjudges to invade thejury's constitutional domain.' Within
the context of the Hobbs Act, especially, a considerable body of case law has
developed that uniformly rejects defendants' appeals to the contrary.245 In
Gaudin, the Supreme Court finally gave defendants the ammunition needed
to overcome this substantial precedent.246 Gaudin expressly mandated that
the jury must find every element of every crime before a conviction could
obtain. 247
In Parker, for the first time since Gaudin, a federal court of appeals
considered instructions that a trial judge delivered to a jury on the Hobbs
Act's "affecting interstate commerce" element.24 Consistent with prior
precedent, the trial judge had instructed the jury that its role in considering
the interstate commerce element was limited to finding the predicate facts,
upon which the judge himself would conclude that interstate commerce had
been affected as a matter of law.249 The judge had decided that the facts
alleged, once proved true, were sufficient to establish an effect on interstate
commerce and had therefore sentenced Parker to nearly 36 years in prison."
DiRico, 78 F.3d 732,736 (Ist Cir. 1996) (interpreting Gaudin to require courts to instructjury
on mixed questions of fact and law for filing false tax return under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (1994));
Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 1995) (interpreting Gaudin to require courts
to instruct jury on mixed questions of fact and law for civil securities fraud under 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j (1994)), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1422 (1996).
243. See supra Part II.B (discussing fourtypes ofjury instructions typically given in Hobbs
Act prosecutions).
244. See supra note 238 and accompanying text (discussing effect of unconstitutional
instructions on defendants' constitutional right to jury trial).
245. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (providing exhaustive list of pre-Gaudin
authority finding that Hobbs Act's jurisdictional element is reserved for judge as matter of
law).
246. See supra notes 23 6-37 and accompanying text (discussing Gaudin and its expansive,
yet simplistic, syllogism).
247. See supra notes 235-42 and accompanying text (discussing Gaudin and providing
syllogism).
248. See United States v. Parker, 73 F.3d 48, 50-53 (5th Cir. 1996) (providing assessment
of Parker's appeal), vacated in part en banc, 104 F.3d 72 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
1720 (1997).
249. See id. at 50-53 (discussing trial judge's instructions); see also supra note 94 and
accompanying text (providing exhaustive list of preceding authority).
250. See United States v. Parker, 104 F.3d 72,73-74 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (assessing effect
of instructions), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1720 (1997).
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On appeal, Parker cited Gaudin as decisive on the issue." The Gaudin
Court had concluded that the jury must determine whether a defendant is
ultimately guilty of every element of the crime charged.2 2 The Parker court
simply applied Gaudin and properly found that the trial judge's instruc-
tions were erroneous.73 After appeals from both parties, however, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed to hear the case en
banc. '
Parker's rights were not the only ones at stake in the en banc decision.'
The constitutional right to jury trial that he sought to protect - ostensibly a
foundation of our criminal justice system - is increasingly denied defen-
dants. 6 Congress is expanding its criminaljurisdiction and has a continuing
incentive to include in its new statutes the same element addressed in Parker-
that the defendant affected interstate commerce. 7 As the interstate com-
merce element becomes more pervasive in the federal criminal code, more
federal defendants face the same type of instructions upon which Parker
appealed." s
As a case of first impression, Parker was the ideal setting within which
the Fifth Circuit should have definitively struck down unconstitutional jury
instructions and restored the right to jury trial for federal defendants. 9 The
court, instead, offered an unreasoned and unsupported opinion providing "no
indication whatsoever to the Bench and bar" as to how Gaudin will apply in
the future or whether it will apply at all.2 The court's opinion appears in one
sentence: "Having reviewed the record and the briefs and arguments of the
251. See Supplement to Initial Brief of Appellant at 1, United States v. Parker, 73 F.3d 48
(5th Cir. 1996) (No. 94-10557) (discussing basis of appeal), vacated en bane, 104 F.3d 72 (5th
Cir. 1997).
252. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511 (1995).
253. See Parker, 73 F.3d at 50-53 (applying Gaudin).
254. See United States v. Parker, 80 F.3d 1042, 1042 (5th Cir. 1996) (granting rehearing
en banc).
255. See Parker, 73 F.3 d at 50-53 (discussing trialjudge's instruction); see also supra note
93 and accompanying text (providing list of preceding cases).
256. See id. (same).
257. See supra Part III (demonstrating that Congress is expanding jurisdiction and has
incentive to include jurisdictional element).
258. See supra note 93 (demonstrating that courts are unwilling to reverse trialjudge'sjury
interstate commerce jury instruction on grounds that instruction directed verdict against
defendant).
259. Compare supra note 242 (assessing Gaudin's impact on lower courts in non-Hobbs
Act cases) with supra notes 19-21 (providing potential impact of Gaudin on Parker).
260. See Parker, 104 F.3d at 75 (DeMoss, J., dissenting) (asserting that majority en banc
is without reason or citation), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1720 (1997).
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parties, we have determined that the trial court committed no Gaudin-type
error."0
1
. Parker himself may not be a legendary criminal, but his petty $459 crime
spree has spawned new precedent that bridges the gap between former Hobbs
Act cases and Gaudin.62 Prior cases authorized courts to remove the inter-
state commerce element from jury determinations, yet Gaudin requires that
the jury determine every element of every crime. 3 The effect on interstate
commerce is an element of the Hobbs Act, and thus Gaudin should require
that the jury determine whether the Government has proven the effect on
interstate commerce.' Inexplicably, the Parker court rebuffed Gaudin's
mandate and denied Parker his fundamental right.265 Having stolen Parker's
right, the court offers only unanswered questions in return.2' The Fifth
Circuit leaves unexplained the future of Gaudin.26
VI. Conclusion
Prior to Gaudin, courts disagreed about whether to charge juries on the
interstate commerce element of federal criminal statutes.26 Gaudin's syllo-
gism should have solved the split: all elements must be charged to the jury,269
interstate commerce is an element of the federal crime, thus, the interstate
commerce element must be charged to the jury.27' However, the Fifth Circuit
in Parker refused to address the issue.2" As a result, the Parker decision now
leaves the right to jury trial in serious peril.272 Unfortunately, as the first to
consider interstate commerce jury instructions after Gaudin, the Parker
decision carries authority that promises to haunt an increasing number of
261. Id at73.
262. See id at 75 (DeMoss, J., dissenting) (calling Parker's robbery garden variety).
263. Compare supra note 93 (analyzing pre-Gaudin opinions) with supra note 237 and
accompanying text (providing Gaudin syllogism).
264. See generally supra note 237 and accompanying text (providing Gaudin syllo-
gism).
265. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (discussing fundamental right to jury
trial).
266. Parker, 104 F.3d at 75 (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 75 (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
268. See supra text accompanying notes 102, 113, 120, 128 (providing four categories of
instructions).
269. See supra note 237 and accompanying text (providing Gaudin syllogism).
270. See suptia note 16 and accompanying text (providing Parker's argument on appeal).
271. See United States v. Parker, 104 F.3d 72, 75 (5th Cir.) (en bane) (DeMoss, J.,
dissenting) (identifying majority opinion's weakness), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1720 (1997).
272. See supra Part IV (discussing right to jury trial).
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federal criminal defendants as they seek their constitutional right to trial by
jury.,
Notwithstanding Parker and its progeny, there is still hope. Lest we
forget: Before the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gaudin, every appel-
late court to consider the issue except the Ninth Circuit agreed that the essen-
tial element of materiality was a question of law for the judge.274 The Su-
preme Court went against the trend.275 What remains to be seen is how many
defendants like Parker will lose their constitutionally protected right to jury
trial before the Hobbs Act instruction is also corrected.
273. See United States v. Hebert, 131 F.3d 514, 521 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding Parker
foreclosed appeal charging Gaudin-type error); United States v. Miles, 122 F.3d 235, 239-40
(5th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (same). Butsee United States v. Castleberry, 116 F.3d 1384, 1387
(11 th Cir.) (extending Gaudin to interstate commerce element, but determining that defendant
was "simply wrong in arguing that thejury in his case did not decide each element of his Hobbs
Act convictions"), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 341 (1997).
274. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 527 (1995) (citing United States v.
Gaudin, 28 F.3d 943,955 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (collecting cases)).
275. See id (acknowledging departure of Supreme Court opinion from settled law).
SYMPOSIUM

